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ABSTRACT 
This report describes the merger process, including types of mergers, 
motivation for merger and acquisition activity, and offensive and defensive 
tactics used to implement or thwart a takeover. The Federal oversight func- 
tions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, 
and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department are discussed. Finally, 
the report briefly raises public policy questions concerning how takeover ac- 
tivity relates to equity, efficiency, and concentration of power within the 
economy and within the firm. 
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MERGER TACTICS AND PUBLIC POLICY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Debate on the public policy implications of merger and acquisition activity 
in the U.S. economy has recently intensified in response to several takeover 
attempts involving large corporations. For example, one of the largest merger 
battles in recent U.S. corporate history was fought over Conoco, with contenders 
Mobil Oil and Seagram losing to Du Pont. Seagram attempted to take over St. Joe 
Minerals Corporation, but Fluor Corporation, a "white knight" more amenable to 
St. Joe's management, was the victor. Mobil Oil lost to U.S. Steel in its joust 
over the prized oil reserves held by Marathon Oil. LTV's attempt to take over 
Grumman was widely publicized, and congressional interest in acquisitions 
broadened to defense-related firms. 
While currently there are not as many mergers and acquisitions as occurred 
in the prior merger wave of the late 1960s, the character of merger activity 
has changed; there are more mergers among very large blue chip companies in an 
increasingly hostile atmosphere. A reason frequently cited for the recent mer- 
ger and acquisition activity is that, with sustained inflation, many corporate 
* This report is based in part on a CRS Member Breakfast Seminar, held on 
October 21, 1981, at which three nationally prominent panelists involved as 
counsels in notable merger and takeover cases spoke. The panelists were: Ira 
Millstein of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, who discussed the antitrust implications of 
merger activities; Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, who discussed 
management's point of view in attempting to implement or block merger attempts; 
and Melvyn Weiss of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Specthrie, who discussed concerns 
of shareholders and non-controlling interests. While this report attempts to 
reflect the panelists' varying points of view, they are not responsible for its 
overall content. 
s e c u r i t i e s  become undervalued compared w i th  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  v a l u e  o f  t h e  com- 
pany ' s  unde r ly ing  a s s e t s .  Th i s  f a c t ,  combined w i th  p e r s i s t e n t l y  h i g h  i n t e r -  
e s t  r a t e s  and t h e  r i s k  premium a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  new b u s i n e s s  v e n t u r e s ,  may pro- 
v i d e  more i n c e n t i v e  t o  purchase e x i s t i n g  b u s i n e s s  e n t i t i e s  t han  t o  i n v e s t  i n  
new p l a n t  o r  i n  new e n t e r p r i s e s .  Notwi ths tanding  t h e  c u r r e n t  economic c l i m a t e ,  
however, which may be i n t e n s i f y i n g  c o r p o r a t e  takeover  b i d d i n g ,  a  c e r t a i n  deg ree  
of merger and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y  i s  t o  be expected i n  t h e  normal func t i on ing  
of  t h e  marke tp l ace .  Mergers and a c q u i s i t i o n s  can p rov ide  f i n a n c i n g ,  management, 
and a c c e s s  t o  r e s o u r c e s  o r  t o  marke ts  which might  no t  o t h e r w i s e  b e  o b t a i n a b l e ,  
o r  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r o f i t  from b e t t e r  u t i l i z a t i o n  of e x i s t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  
a r e  i n a d e q u a t e l y  managed by c u r r e n t  management. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  an e n t r e p r e n e u r  
who has  b u i l t  up a  company may seek  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s e l l  i t ,  and sha reho lde r s  
may have an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e c e i v e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  premium r e t u r n  on t h e i r  
i nves tmen t .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  merger and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y  may no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
produce s u c c e s s f u l  b u s i n e s s  combinat ions.  Ba r ron ' s  r e p o r t s  t h a t  numerous mer- 
g e r s  and acqu i s i t i ons - - such  as  Exxon's purchase of  Re l i ance  E l e c t r i c  Co. and 
Mob i l ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  Marcor ( i t s e l f  a  combinat ion of Montgomery Ward and Con- 
t a i n e r  Corpo ra t i on  of America)--have been d i s a p p o i n t i n g  because t h e  acqui red  
companies have not  performed a s  we l l  a s  a n t i c i p a t e d .  2/ There i s  a l s o  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e b a t e  about  whether mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n s  o c c u r r i n g  a s  a  
r e s u l t  o f  market  f o r c e s  lead  t o  b e n e f i c i a l  and e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  of  r e sou rce s  
1 /  Drucker ,  P e t e r  F. The F ive  Rules  of Succes s fu l  A c q u i s i t i o n .  Wall 
s t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  October  15 ,  1981. 
2/ See B l e i b e r g ,  Robert M. Too Far A f i e l d ?  ... Some Big O i l  Company 
~ a k e o v e r s  Have Come t o  G r i e f .  Ba r ron ' s ,  August 10 ,  1981. p. 7 .  See a l s o  Wayne, 
L e s l i e .  Joys of F l ee ing  t he  Corporate  S t a b l e  . . .Conglomerates f i n d  t hey  o f t e n  
c a n ' t  p r o f i t  from t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n s  of t h e  l a s t  merger wave, so t h e y  s e l l  t h e  
u n i t s  t o  t h e  people  running  them, who t h r i v e .  New York Times, November 15,  
1981. p. 26 .  
in society or whether resulting corporate entities will be in a better position 
to thwart competition in the economy. Of particular concern is the question 
whether the acquiring company in a takeover situation provides "synergistic" 
benefits or improved management for the acquired company such that the value of 
the new entity, and thus the value to society, is greater than the value of the 
separate companies. Also of interest to legislators is the question whether 
merger and takeover activity leads to a diversion of capital for "non-productive" 
uses such as buying existing entities rather than for investment in new plant 
and equipment, deemed more "productive .I1 
These considerations about the role of merger and acquisition activity in 
the economy as a whole are present whether the takeover bid is friendly--that 
is, acceptable to the selling company--or whether the bid is hostile and op- 
posed by the subject or "target" company. Eut when the merger process and tac- 
tics employed result in dispute between various interested parties (such as 
management, shareholders, labor, pension fund holders, etc.), another dimension 
of public policy is exposed. The merger battle itself gives rise to issues 
which relate not only to economic efficiency and concentration of power through- 
out the economy as a whole, but also to equity, economic concentration, and 
efficiency issues within the individual firm. Several major questions arise in 
this connection: 
(1) To what extent should management be free to implement or block a 
merger? In rejecting a takeover bid--which may be at a substantial 
premium for shareholders--is management motivated, as many commenta- 
tors contend, only by a desire to stay in office or has management, 
as other commentators contend, rejected the bid for sound business 
planning reasons? 
What if management simply wants to operate independently for busi- 
ness judgment reasons or because it fears that a parent company will 
be less concerned about employees or the community in which the com- 
pany operates? What if these reasons only transparently mask manage- 
ment's self-interest? 
( 2 )  Can v a r i o u s  subgroups  w i t h i n  a  c o r p o r a t i o n  ( s u c h  a s  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  em- 
p l o y e e s ,  and p e n s i o n  fund r e c i p i e n t s )  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i f  t h e y  
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  p l a n  of  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  i n s t i t u t e d  by management? 
For  example ,  d o e s  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r  who w i s h e s  t o  t e n d e r  h i s  s h a r e s  t o  a  
b i d d e r  and t h u s  r e c e i v e  a  premium have  a d e q u a t e  means t o  make s u r e  he 
i s  n o t  d e n i e d  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  t e n d e r  and p r o t e c t  h i s  economic i n t e r e s t s  
i f  t h e y  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  management ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  b l o c k  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r ?  
What r e c o u r s e  d o  g r o u p s  such  a s  p e n s i o n  fund r e c i p i e n t s  have i f  man- 
agement a r r a n g e s  f o r  t h e  u s e  of  p e n s i o n  fund money t o  buy company 
s t o c k  t o  keep  i t  from a  b i d d e r ' s  hands?  The p u r c h a s e  o f  t h i s  s t o c k  
i s  o b v i o u s l y  i n t e n d e d  t o  t h w a r t  t h e  t a k e o v e r ,  and i f  t h i s  d e f e n s i v e  
t a c t i c  i s  s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h e  company's s t o c k  and t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  pen- 
s i o n  fund may d r o p .  3/ - 
I n  a n o t h e r  example ,  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  where  a b i d d i n g  company p a i n s  con- 
t r o l  o f  a  t a r g e t  by  r e c e i v i n g  51 p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  s h a r e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  means 
o f  a  t e n d e r ,  a r e  t h e r e  a d e q u a t e  means t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  economic i n -  
t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  remain ing  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  who d i d  n o t  t e n d e r  
and a r e  t h e n  " f r o z e n  o u t "  by t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  company and o b l i g e d  t o  
a c c e p t  u n f a v o r a b l e  terms f o r  t h e i r  s h a r e s ?  4 /  - 
Another  i s s u e  r e l a t e d  t o  " f r e e z e - o u t s "  i s  t h e  t r e n d  i n  "going p r i v a t e "  
t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  whereby a  g roup  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  " f r e e z e "  o r  
"squeeze"  o u t  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  t h e  company p r i -  
v a t e  a t  what many b e l i e v e  a r e  i n a d e q u a t e  p r i c e s - - p r i c e s  which i f  o f -  
f e r e d  t o  management o r  t h e s e  c o n t r o l l i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  a  t e n d e r  
o f f e r  s i t u a t i o n  might  w e l l  be  r e j e c t e d .  How c a n  t h e  compet ing i n -  
t e r e s t s  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  and m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  b e  r e s o l v e d  i n  t h e s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ?  
( 3 )  Are t h e  t a c t i c s  employed by management t o  de fend  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  a  
h o s t i l e  t a k e o v e r  b i d  so  i n f l u e n c e d  by  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  a s  t o  r e s u l t  
31 T h i s  was r e p o r t e d  t o  have been one o f  G r u m a n ' s  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  t o  
d e f e a t  t h e  LTV t a k e o v e r  a t t e m p t .  See C a r l e y ,  W i l l i a m  M. G r u m a n  Pens ion  P l a n  
Buys More S t o c k  i n  E f f o r t  t o  Block LTV, Which P l a n s  S u i t .  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  
Oc tober  1 3 ,  1981. See  a l s o  C a r l e y ,  Wi l l i am M. G r u m a n ,  by A c q u i r i n g  I t s  Own 
S h a r e s ,  Seems t o  Be Gain ing  i n  Bid t o  Block LTV. Wall  S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  Octo- 
b e r  1 4 ,  1981. 
4 /  T h i s  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  b e  a t  i s s u e  i n  t h e  U.S. S t e e l  t e n d e r  o f f e r  f o r  
~ a r a t F o n .  U.S. S t e e l  o f f e r e d  125 d o l l a r s  pe r  s h a r e  f o r  51 p e r c e n t  o f  Mara thon ' s  
s h a r e s ,  and t h e n  proposed t o  o f f e r  d e b e n t u r e s  t h e  s t o c k  market  h a s  v a l u e d  a t  
l e s s  t h a n  80 d o l l a r s  pe r  s h a r e  f o r  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  49 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  s h a r e s .  
See O ' ~ o y l e ,  Thomas. U.S. S t e e l  Faces  R i s i n g  D i s s e n t  Over Bid t o  Swap 12.5% 
Notes  f o r  R e s t  o f  Marathon.  Wall  S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  F e b r u a r y  1 7 ,  1982. While  
Marathon employees  owning s t o c k  were  urged t o  t e n d e r  t o  U.S. S t e e l ,  t h e r e  
a r e  i n s t a n c e s  where management may u r g e  employees  n o t  t o  t e n d e r  s o  a s  t o  d e f e a t  
t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  employees cou ld  be i n  a  s i m i l i a r  " f r o z e n  o u t "  
p o s i t i o n  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  
in "unproductive" use of resources, or is the public interest served 
by allowing management to conduct tactical maneuvers in a takeover 
situation? 
This report discusses types of mergers and acquisitions, motivations for 
merger and takeover activity, and offensive and defensive tactics used to imple- 
ment or thwart a merger or takeover. The role of the various Federal oversight 
bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, is ex- 
plored. Finally, public policy issues raised in connection with takeover activ- 
ity are very briefly sunrmarized, including equity, efficiency, and concentration 
of power within the economy and within the firm as various competing groups 
(management, shareholders, employees) struggle in the takeover process to pro- 
tect their economic interests. 

I.  TYPES OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Merger and takeover  a c t i v i t y  has  tended t o  come i n  waves and has  been 
accomplished i n  a  v a r i e t y  of  forms, some o f  which have r e c e n t l y  evolved i n  
response  t o  changing marke t ,  r e g u l a t o r y ,  and j u d i c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  There have 
been fou r  major waves o f  merger and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y  s i n c e  t h e  t u r n  of  t h e  
20th cen tu ry .  Each pe r iod  has  emphasized d i f f e r e n t  types of mergers  and i n  re -  
c e n t  pe r iods  t h e  predominant l e g a l  form used t o  e f f e c t  merger  and takeover  
a c t i v i t y  has  v a r i e d .  This  s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  g e n e r i c  t ypes  o f  merge r s ,  t h e  
predominant f e a t u r e s  o f  each o f  t h e  waves, and t h e  c o n t r a s t  between t h e  c u r r e n t  
wave and p r i o r  waves. 
A. Generic  T v ~ e s  of  Mergers 
B r i e f l y ,  t h e  g e n e r i c  t ypes  of  mergers  can be  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  t h r e e  groups :  
( 1 )  Hor i zon ta l  merger - t h e  merger o f  two o r  more compe t i t o r s .  The com- 
pan ie s  must produce one o r  more of t h e  same, o r  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d ,  pro- 
d u c t s  i n  t h e  same geographic  market .  51  Products  which a r e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n t e r changeab le  i n  t h e i r e n d  uses  o r  f o r  which t h e r e  
e x i s t s  c r o s s  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand may be  h e l d  t o  be w i t h i n  t h e  same 
product  marke t .  
V e r t i c a l  merger - t h e  amalgamation of  two f i r m s  t h a t  p r e v i o u s l y  
func t ioned  a t  d i f f e r e n t  v e r t i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i . e . ,  i n  a  
cus tomer-suppl ie r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The a c q u i s i t i o n  i s  des igna t ed  
forward v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  when a  s e l l e r  a c q u i r e s  an a c t u a l  o r  
p o t e n t i a l  customer and as backward v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  when a  
customer a c q u i r e s  an a c t u a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l  s u v v l i e r .  6 1  V e r t i c a l  * * 
i n t e g r a t i o n  may be  comple te ,  which o c c u r s  when t h e  e n t i r e  supp ly  
sou rce  o r  o u t l e t  system i s  con ta ined  w i t h i n  t h e  new e n t e r p r i s e ;  
i t  i s  p a r t i a l  when some purchas ing  o r  s e l l i n g  con t inues  t o  be  con- 
duc ted  wi th  o u t s i d e  f i rms .  71 - 
5 /  von Kalinowski ,  J u l i a n  0.  A n t i t r u s t  Laws and Trade Regu la t i on .  
~olum; 161, Bus iness  Organ iza t ions ,  573.01. See a l s o  F e d e r a l  Trade Commission. 
S t a t i s t i c a l  Report on Mergers and A c q u i s i t i o n s ,  J u l y  1974. p. 162. 
6 /  von Kalinowski ,  op. c i t . ,  573.01. - 
7/ von Kalinowski ,  op. c i t . ,  573.03. - 
13) Conglomerate merger - a l l  mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  
not h o r i z o n t a l  o r  v e r t i c a l .  w i t h i n  t h i s  non-homogeneous c l a s s  of  
merge r s ,  t h e r e  a r e  four  d i s t i n c t  s u b c a t e g o r i e s :  
( a )  Product  e x t e n s i o n  merger - t h e  merger  of  companies t h a t  manu- 
f a c u t u r e  o r  s e l l  p roducts  which, a l though d i f f e r e n t ,  a r e  so 
complementary t h a t  t hey  can  be  produced wi th  s i m i l a r  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
marketed through t h e  same channe l s ,  and a d v e r t i s e d  by t h e  same 
media. 8/ An example would be t h e  merger o f  a  l i q u i d  b leach  
wi th  a  T i q u i d  s t a r c h  manufac turer ;  i n  t h i s  ca se  product ion  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f a c i l i l t i e s  may be shared .  
(b) Geographic market ex t ens ion  merger - a  merger i n  which t h e  
acqui red  and acqu i r ing  companies manufac ture  o r  market t h e  same 
p roduc t s  bu t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  geographic marke t s ,  o r ,  what may amount 
t o  t h e  same t h i n g ,  t o  d i f f e r e n t  customer c l a s s e s .  An example of  a  
geographic  market ex t ens ion  merger i s  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  by a  l o c a l  
food cha in  i n  New York o f  a  l o c a l  food cha in  i n  Chicago; i n  t h i s  
manner, l a r g e  n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  d a i r y  and r e t a i l  g roce ry  indus-  
t r i e s  have developed.  S ince  geographic  market  ex t ens ion  mergers  
c l o s e l y  resemble h o r i z o n t a l  mergers ,  t h e y  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  r e f e r r e d  
t o  a s  "chain" h o r i z o n t a l s ,  9/  except  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f i rms  
a r e  not  i n  d i r e c t  compet i t i& wi th  one ano the r  s i n c e  t hey  a r e  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  geographic  l o c a t i o n s .  
( c )  Rec ip roca l  d e a l i n g  o r  l eve rage  merger - a c q u i s i t i o n  of  a  f i rm  
which i s  a  s u p p l i e r  o r  customer of a  t h i r d  f i rm  which s e l l s  t o  o r  . - 
buys from t h e  acqu i r ing  f i rm.  The merger may c r e a t e  an opportu-  
n i t y  t o  engage i n  " r e c i p r o c a l  dea l ing , ' '  a  term which r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
use of buying power t o  s ecu re  an advantage i n  t he  s a l e  of  p roduc t s .  
The acqu i r ing  company may seek  t o  c r e a t e  s a l e s  o u t l e t s  f o r  i t s  ac- 
qu i r ed  f i rm o r  i t  may seek  t o  s ecu re  a  sou rce  of supply  i f  i t  con- 
d i t i o n s  i t s  purchases from a  t h i r d  p a r t y  on t h e  l a t t e r ' s  agreement 
t o  s e l l  t h e  acquired f i r m ' s  products  o r  t o  s ecu re  a  f i rm  supply  f o r  
t h e  acqui red  f i rm.  g/ 
( d )  Pure conglomerate merger - a  merger i n  which t h e r e  a r e  no d i s -  
c e r n a b l e  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e  acqu i r ing  and acqui red  
f i rms .  
In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  gene r i c  t ypes  of mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  t h e r e  a r e  
j o i n t  v e n t u r e s ,  whereby companies j o i n  t o g e t h e r  t o  form a  new c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y  
8/ A complementary r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s i m i l a r  products  e x i s t s  when a  
r i s e  Tn t h e  consumption o r  purchases o f  one causes  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  demand f o r  
t h e  o t h e r .  Boulding,  Economic Analyses,  a s  c i t e d  i n  von Kalinowski ,  573.04. 
9/ von Kalinowski ,  op. c i t . ,  573.05. - 
101 von ~ a l i n o w s k i ,  op. c i t . ,  S73.06. -
without  l o s i n g  t h e i r  own s e p a r a t e  i d e n t c t i e s .  For example, i n  t h e  energy  in-  
d u s t r y ,  u t i l i t y  and mining companies and i n t e r s t a t e  g a s  p i p e l i n e  companies have 
r e c e n t l y  formed j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  f o r  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t s .  
Methods Used t o  Merge o r  Take Over 
The term "merger" is o f t e n  l o o s e l y  used t o  d e s c r i b e  a  v a r i e t y  o f  a c q u i s i -  
t i o n  and takeover  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  A merger ,  however, r e f e r s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  " the  
ca se  i n  which t h e  a s s e t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  of  t h e  s e l l i n g  company a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  and absorbed by t h e  buying co rpo ra t ion . "  - 111 The s e l l i n g  company t h u s  d i s -  
appears  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  e n t i t y .  I n  a  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o r  amalgamation, on t h e  o t h e r  
hand, i t  i s  not s p e c i f i e d  who i s  buying whom. 
Mergers a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  S t a t e  law p r o v i s i o n s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  p u b l i c l y  he ld  
companies r e q u i r i n g  approval  o f  t h e  s e l l i n g  company's board of  d i r e c t o r s ,  and 
i s suance  of Fede ra l  SEC-approved, and i n  some c a s e s  State-approved merger proxy 
m a t e r i a l s  t o  sha reho lde r s .  Shareholder  approval  i s  a l s o  r e q u i r e d ;  i n  some 
S t a t e s  a  two- th i rds  v o t e  i s  neces sa ry ,  a l t hough  i n  many S t a t e s  o n l y  a  m a j o r i t y  
of t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s  need approve.  ons solid at ions r e q u i r e  approval  o f  boards  of 
d i r e c t o r s  a s  we l l  a s  approval  of e i t h e r  two- th i rds  o r  a  m a j o r i t y  of  s h a r e h o l d e r s  
f o r  bo th  companies. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l  merger o r  n e g o t i a t e d  a c q u i s i t i o n  might be  accomplished i n  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  terms i n c l u d i n g  c a s h ,  s h a r e s  i n  t h e  buying com- 
pany, c o n v e r t i b l e  deben tu re s  (bonds i s sued  by t h e  buyer  which a r e  c o n v e r t i b l e  
i n t o  s t o c k ) ,  o r  o t h e r  deb t  i n s t rumen t s  such a s  non-conver t ib le  deben tu re s .  The 
nego t i a t ed  a c q u i s i t i o n  p roces s  i s  more l eng thy  and g e n e r a l l y  l e s s  d i r e c t  t han  
111 Brea ley  , Richard ,  and Steward Meyers . P r i n c i p l e s  of  Corpora te  
~ i n a n z .  New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981. p. 671.  
t h e  much p u b l i c i z e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r  t akeover  p roces s .  But ,  "a l though much of t h e  
a t t e n t i o n  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  h a s  been d i r e c t e d  t o  c o n t e s t e d  takeovers--now a  per-  
manent and n o i s y  p a r t  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n s  scene--most a q u i s i t i o n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
a r e  s t i l l  of t h e  n e g o t i a t e d  v a r i e t y  wi th  o n l y  two p l a y e r s ,  a  s e l l e r ,  and a  pur- 
c h a s e r ,  a c t i n g  v o l u n t a r i l y . "  12/  -
A  t a k e o v e r  b id  o r  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s :  
. . . a  method of a c q u i r i n g  s h a r e s  of  a  " t a r g e t "  o r  " s u b j e c t  company" i n  
which a  "bidder"  makes an o f f e r  t o  purchase  s h a r e s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
t a r g e t ' s  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  Although such o f f e r s  may be f o r  any pe rcen t age  
of  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  o u t s t a n d i n g  s t o c k  and f o r  a  v a r i e t y  of pu rposes ,  t hey  
a r e  u s u a l l y  des igned  t o  o b t a i n  c o n t r o l  of t h e  t a r g e t .  S ince  t h e  o f f e r  
i s  made d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  a  t akeover  b id  enab l e s  
a  b i d d e r  t o  a c q u i r e  [ c o n t r o l  o f ]  t h e  t a r g e t  wi thout  approva l  of t h e  
t a r g e t ' s  board of  d i r e c t o r s  and wi thout  t h e  approva l  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  
s h a r e h o l d e r s . .  . 131 -
For a  v a r i e t y  of t a c t i c a l  r ea sons  d i s cus sed  subsequen t ly  i n  S e c t i o n  I1 A,  t h e  
takeover  and merger p roces s  now f r e q u e n t l y  i nvo lves  a  two-step and sometimes even 
a  t h r e e - s t e p  p roces s  whereby a  b idde r  a c q u i r e s  a  b lock  of a  s u b j e c t ' s  s t o c k ,  makes 
a  t ende r  o f f e r  f o r  a  p o r t i o n  o r  a l l  of t h e  remaining s t o c k ,  and then  fo l lows  up 
wi th  a  formal  a c q u i s i t i o n  t o  a c q u i r e  t h e  remainder  of t h e  s h a r e s  which were no t  
t endered  i n  t h e  p r i o r  s t a g e .  
Merger t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  i n  many c a s e s ,  [ a r e ]  used t o  "mop up" t he  
d e a l ,  i . e . ,  t o  p ick  up t h e  s h a r e s  not  t endered  a f t e r  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  
s e l l e r  [ h a s ]  passed t o  t h e  pu rchase r .  The m u l t i s t e p  t r a n s a c t i o n  was 
born a s  a  means of  s e c u r i n g  f o r  t h e  pu rchase r  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  s e l l e r  
( o r  a t  l e a s t  a  l e g  up on any compe t i t i on  which might emerge once t h e  
n e g o t i a t e d  d e a l  was announced) much f a s t e r  t han  through t r a d i t i o n a l  
merger t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  t h u s  h e l p i n g  t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  t he  d e a l  would u l t i -  
m a t e l y  go through.  E/ 
121 Freund ,  James C. and Edward F. Greene. Subs tance  Over Form S-14: 
A ~ro'i;;;sal t o  Reform SEC Regula t ion  of  Negot ia ted  A c q u i s i t i o n s .  The Business  
Lawyer, v  . 36,  J u l y  1981. p. 1485-6. 
13/ Ka t che r ,  Richard D. Takeovers:  Seminar on Bus iness  A c q u i s i t i o n s ,  
~ e n d e r ~ f f e r s  and Stockholder  L i t i g a t i o n .  I l l i n o i s  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Continuing 
Educa t i on ,  Chicago,  I l l i n o i s ,  June 12-13, 1980. p.  4-1. 
141 Freund and Greene , op. c i t  . , p. 1486. -
C. Waves of  Merger and A c q u i s i t i o n  A c t i v i t y  
Four p e r i o d s  o f  i nc reased  i n t e n s i t y  i n  mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n s  have 
occurred  s i n c e  j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  t u r n  of  t h e  20th  c e n t u r y :  
( 1 )  1896 t o  1904, c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by h o r i z o n t a l  mergers  t o  ach i eve  
dominant f i rms  and nea r  monopolies ; 
( 2 )  1919 t o  1929, c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by h o r i z o n t a l  mergers  o f  l e s s  t han  
dominant f i rms  t o  form o l i g o p o l i e s ;  
' ( 3 )  1960s,  peaking i n  1968, c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by conglomerate mergers  
t o  ach i eve  l a r g e  amalgamations o f  g e n e r a l l y  u n r e l a t e d  b u s i n e s s e s ;  
( 4 )  l a t e  1970s and con t inu ing  t o  i n t e n s i f y  i n  1981, c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
mergers  among l a r g e ,  we l l - e s t ab l i shed  f i rms  i n  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  
h o s t i l e  atmosphere,  p r i m a r i l y  t o  purchase  e x i s t i n g  undervalued 
b u s i n e s s  e n t i t i e s .  
1 .  Mergers During t h e  E a r l y  1900s 
The f i r s t  wave, e s t ima ted  t o  have involved 15 pe rcen t  o f  a l l  U.S. manu- 
f a c t u r i n g  p l a n t s  and anployees ,  i s  cons idered  t o  have begun a s  t h e  Nation r e -  
covered from t h e  dep re s s ion  of 1893 and t o  have cont inued  u n t i l  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  
of 1904. 151 The predominant f e a t u r e  of  t h i s  per iod  was t h e  u se  o f  h o r i z o n t a l  -
mergers  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  a  number of smal l  f i rms  i n  an i n d u s t r y  i n t o  a  s i n g l e  
near-monopolis t ic  dominant f i rm.  Companies such a s  Du Pont ,  American Tobacco, 
and U.S. S t e e l  (formed from 785 s e p a r a t e  p l a n t s )  epi tomized t h i s  t r e n d .  
Oddly enough, t h i s  a c t i v i t y  went on d e s p i t e  passage  o f  t h e  Sherman Act 
i n  1890. One argument i s  t h a t  t h e  Sherman Act encouraged monopol iza t ion  s i n c e  
151 See Nelson,  Ralph L. Merger Movements i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
~ r i n c z o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  P r ince ton ,  1959. p .  29, 53; Markhem, J e s s e  W .  
Survey of t h e  Evidence and Findings  on Mergers. Nat iona l  Bureau of  Economic 
Research Conference Repor t ;  Business Concen t r a t i on  and P r i c e  P o l i c y .  P r i n c e t o n  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1955. p. 28, 29, 53; Moody, John.  The Truth  About T r u s t s .  
Moody P u b l i s h i n g ,  1904. p. 486,  487; a s  c i t e d  i n  U.S. L i b r a r y  of  Congress .  
Congress iona l  Research S e r v i c e .  A n t i t r u s t  P o l i c y  Towards Mergers .  Report 
77-263, by Howard Useem. Washington, 1977. 
it made collusion illegal (but not mergers) and put an end to the trustee de- 
vice, thereby forcing industrialists seeking market control to resort to com- 
plete fusion of their separate companies. 16/ - 
The second wave occurred from 1916 and ended abrubtly in 1929 with the 
collapse of the stock market. In this period, firms secondary to the dominant 
firms frequently undertook mergers which transformed some industries from dom- 
inance by a single large firm to oligopoly, dominance by a few large firms. 171 - 
Merger activity was especially intense in the following industries: primary met 
als, petroleum products, food products, chemicals, and transportation equipment. 
2. The Late 1960s Conglomerate Merger Wave 
The third wave--the "conglomerate" wave--peaked in 1968. It was charac- 
terized by practical application of the theory that managerial talent was more 
important than knowledge of any particular line of business and that extremely 
capable managers could take over any business and improve it. The notion of 
"synergym--that a new entity is worth more than the sum of its separate parts-- 
was applied not only to combinations based on extending lines of business into 
profitable areas but also to well-publicized managerial talent attributed to 
such people as James Ling of Ling-Temco-Vought, whose transactions epitomized 
the era. 
Some analysts contend that stricter interpretation of antitrust laws appli- 
cable to horizontal and vertical acquisitions was a factor in the growth of the 
conglomerate trend because it would be difficult under existing antitrust 
16/ See Useem, op. cit., p. 29-31. 
17/ Stigler, George. Monopoly and 
~ c o n o z c  Review, May 1950. 
Oligopoly by Merger. American 
s t a t u t e s  t o  c o n t e s t  a  merger on grounds of market concen t ra t ion  where separa te  
markets a r e  involved.  But accounting techniques  were a l s o  repor ted  t o  have 
fue led  t h e  l a t e  1960s merger wave; t h e s e  provided i n c e n t i v e s  i n  s e v e r a l  ways. 
"Pooling-of-earnings" techniques permitted companies t o  add t h e i r  balance s h e e t s  
and income s ta tements  toge the r  a s  i f  t h e  two companies were one. I f  i n v e s t o r s  
then compared the  r e s u l t i n g  pooled ea rn ings  wi th  ea rn ings  p r i o r  t o  pool ing,  t h i s  
would c r e a t e  a  d i s t o r t e d  growth t r end  which on ly  t h e  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  in- 
v e s t o r s  might d i sce rn .  2 1  Another d i s t o r t i o n  occurred wi th  t h e  s a l e  of a s s e t s  
t h a t  were thought t o  be "undervalued" ( i . e . ,  t h e  book value-assets  shown on 
t h e  company's balance shee t  d ivided by t h e  number of shares-was l e s s  than the  
market va lue ) .  "Goodwill" o r  i n t a n g i b l e  a s s e t s  were c r e a t e d  i f  payment f o r  the  
company exceeded the  book value  of i t s  sha res .  F a i l u r e  t o  amortize t h i s  good- 
w i l l  by annual charges t o  income i n f l a t e d  ea rn ings ,  thereby c r e a t i n g  a  d is-  
t o r t e d  ea rn ings  t r e n d ,  which i n  t u r n  required f u r t h e r  "chain l e t t e r "  mergers 
t o  maintain the  t r end .  F i n a l l y ,  an a r t i f i c i a l  boost t o  ea rn ings  under pooling 
accounting a rose  through use i n  t h e  takeover of p re fe r red  s t o c k  o r  c o n v e r t i b l e  
debentures  (bonds conver t ib le  i n t o  common s tock  which enabled t h e  i n v e s t o r  t o  
share  i n  apprec ia t ion  of s t o c k  p r i c e s  without t h e  r i s k  of a  f a l l  i n  t h e  conver- 
s i o n  r a t e ) .  Under accounting r u l e s  i n  e f f e c t  p r i o r  t o  1969, ea rn ings  per sha re  
of common s tock  could a r t i f i c i a l l y  inc rease  wi th  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  debenture 
r a t e .  191 - 
181 A s  an example, when Leasco acqu 
an investment p o r t f o l i o  of s tocks  c a r r i e d  
was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  lower than market value  
t h e  s e c u r i t i e s ,  making i t  appear t h a t  t h e  
creased ea rn inns  when i n  f a c t  i t  was mere 
red Reliance Insurance,  i t  acquired 
on Re l i ance ' s  books a t  a  c o s t  which 
Af te r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  Leasco s o l d  
merged e n t i t y  had r e a l i z e d  g r e a t l y  in- 
y l i q u i d a t i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  a t  t h e  same - 
p r i c e s  t h a t  e x i s t e d  on t h e  d a t e  of a c q u i s i t i o n .  (Telephone communication from 
a t t o r n e y  Melvyn Weiss t o  CRS, February 12, 1982.) 
191 See S t e i n e r ,  Pe te r  0. Mergers, Motives, E f f e c t s ,  P o l i c i e s .  Univer- 
s i t y  of Michigan Press ,  1975. p. 109-117; and Br i lo f  f  , A. J. Accounting 
P r a c t i c e s  and t h e  Merger Movement. Notre Dame Lawyer, vo l .  4 5 ,  Summer 1970. 
p. 604-628. 
I n  an a t t emp t  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e s e  k inds  of d i s t o r t i o n s  i n  e a r n i n g s ,  t h e  SEC 
has  s i n c e  r e q u i r e d  e i t h e r  r e t r o a c t i v e  pool ing  ( t o  i n s u r e  c o n t i n u i t y  of  e a rn ings  
compar i sons)  o r  purchase  accoun t ing ,  whereby acqu i r ed  a s s e t s  a r e  va lued  a t  t h e i r  
market  p r i c e ,  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  d i s t o r t i o n s  a r i s i n g  from use and a m o r t i z a t i o n  of  
goodwi l l .  A l so ,  more s t r i n g e n t  account ing  f o r  e a r n i n g s  f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  
from conve r s ion  from p r e f e r r e d  s t o c k  and deben tu re s  h a s  been i n s t i t u t e d .  
3 .  Comparisons Between t h e  Curren t  and Prev ious  Pe r iods  of 
Merger A c t i v i t y  
The c u r r e n t  merger wave, which began i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s and i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  
1981, d i f f e r s  i n  s e v e r a l  ways from t h a t  o f  t h e  l a t e  1960s. Although f r i e n d l y  
d e a l s  a r e  s t i l l  t h e  dominant form, an i n c r e a s i n g  number of  combinat ions a r e  now 
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  h o s t i l e  a c t i o n s .  More l a r g e  b lue  c h i p  companies and "old l i n e "  
inves tment  bankers  and banks now view t h e  p roces s  a s  a c c e p t a b l e .  201 While -
most o f  t h e  d e a l s  i nvo lve  smal l  companies, 21/ an i n c r e a s i n g  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  d e a l s  -
t ends  t o  be l a r g e r  i n  d o l l a r  v a l u e  and t o  be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  h i g h e r  f requency  
o f  b idd ing  wars ,  which r a i s e  t h e  s t a k e s  between competing companies; examples 
a r e  t he  b idd ing  wars of  t h e  ~obil-Conoco-Du Pont and t h e  Mobil-Marathon-U.S. 
S t e e l  c o n t e s t s .  
W. T. Grim & Co., which t r a c k s  merger announcements,  r epo r t ed  t h a t  1981 
merger a c t i v i t y  i nc r ea sed  27% t o  2,395 t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  compared wi th  1,889 a  yea r  
e a r l i e r .  This  r a t e  does  no t  ye t  approach t h e  peak of t h e  l a s t  wave, when over  
20/ Pha lon ,  Richard .  The Takeover Barons of Wall S t r e e t .  G. P. Putnam's -
Sons,  New York, 1981. p .  90. 
211 For a  more complete  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  compos i t ion  of r e c e n t  t ende r  
o f f e r F b y  s i z e  and f o r  a l l  i n d u s t r i e s  (beyond t h e  l i m i t e d  manufac tur ing  and 
mining sample t h e  FTC p r o v i d e s ) ,  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  of Congress .  Congressional  
Research S e r v i c e .  Corpora te  Mergers Through Tender O f f e r s :  Measurement and Pub- 
l i c  P o l i c y  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Report No. 81-260 E ,  by Kevin F. Winch. Washington, 
1981. wa ere in after c i t e d  a s  Winch, Corpora te  Mergers . )  
6,000 t r a n s a c t i o n s  were r epo r t ed  i n  1968. The 1981 t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  a s  measured i n  
c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s ,  have grown s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n  d o l l a r  volume. According t o  t h e  
Grim d a t a ,  t h e  t o t a l  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r  v a l u e  pa id  f o r  a c q u i s i t i o n s  s e t  a  new 
record  f o r  t h e  t h i r d  consecu t ive  yea r :  $82.6 b i l l i o n  f o r  1981, almost  double  
t h e  $44.3 b i l l i o n  f o r  a l l  of 1980 22/ and t h e  $43 b i l l i o n  f o r  1968. While t h e  -
d o l l a r  volume of  d e a l s  i nc reased  d r a m a t i c a l l y  between 1981 and 1980, however, 
a f t e r  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e  1981 t o t a l  was a c t u a l l y  17% l e s s  t han  t h e  
1968 d o l l a r  v a l u e  ( i n  1981 t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  were va lued  a t  approximate ly  $43 
b i l l i o n  i n  1972 c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s ,  compared wi th  t h e  1968 t o t a l  o f  approximate ly  
$52 b i l l i o n  i n  1972 c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s ) .  
There were twelve t r a n s a c t i o n s  du r ing  1981 va lued  a t  more t han  $1 b i l l i o n - -  
Grim r e f e r s  t o  t h e s e  a s  "mega-deals." Together t h e y  c o n t r i b u t e d  $38.4 b i l l i o n  
t o  t h e  $82.6 b i l l i o n  t o t a l .  These t r a n s a c t i o n s  inc luded  t h e  fo l lowing  wide ly  
pub l i c i zed  d e a l s :  
1. t h e  $8 b i l l i o n  cash and s t o c k  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Conoco, Inc . by t h e  
Du Pont Co., one of t h e  l a r g e s t  c o r p o r a t e  t akeove r s  i n  r e c e n t  U.S. 
h i s t o r y ;  
/ / 
2. t h e  $4.3 b i l l i o n  purchase of Texasgul f ,  I n c .  by S o c i e t e  Na t iona l e  
E l f  Aqu i t a ine  of  France ;  
3. t h e  takeover  of  S t .  Joe  Minera ls  Corp. by F luo r  Corp. f o r  $2.7 
b i l l i o n  i n  cash  and s tock ;  
4. t h e  $2 b i l l i o n  cash a c q u i s i t i o n  of  Kennecott Corp. by Standard O i l  
Co. of Ohio; and 
5. t h e  $1.8 b i l l i o n  merger between Nabisco,  Inc . and Standard Brands,  Inc . 
But Grim a l s o  r e p o r t s  t h a t  "while mammoth t akeove r s  reached record-  
breaking  l e v e l s ,  a c q u i s i t i o n s  of smal l  p r i v a t e l y  he ld  companies remain t h e  fo- 
c a l  point"  o f  mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n  (MA) a c t i v i t y .  Of t h e  2,395 t r a n s a c t i o n s  
221 P r e s s  Re lease ,  "W.T. G r i m  & Co. Announces Record Year i n  Mergers," 
W.T. Grinnu & Co., Chicago, I l l i n o i s ,  January  2 ,  1982. 
tabulated for 1981, 1,332 or 56 percent involved the sale of a closely held 
firm. This figure actually represents an increase from 52 percent in 1980. 
The second most active segment of MSA activity involved divestitures. Accord- 
ing to Grimm, the sale of divisions, subsidiaries, or product lines in 1981 ac- 
counted for 830 transactions or 35 percent of all acquisition activity. 231 -
Data compiled by the Federal Trade Commission ( F T C )  are not as current as 
the Grimm data, nor are they comparable. Most recent FTC data are preliminary 
for 1979, and they are only for publicly held manufacturing and mining companies 
with an acquisition value of $10 million or more. Thus, they do not include ser- 
vice companies, which have been important participants in MCA activity. (By com- 
parison, Grimm data are current and include all merger transactions with no 
restriction as to value or industry.) Nevertheless, the FTC data permit de- 
tailed historical comparisons between the current and last merger periods. The 
following tables show: 
- conglomerate mergers predominate in both periods (See Table 1); 
- there were fewer acquisitions in 1979 than in 1968, but the average 
current dollar value per acquisition was greater in 1979 (See Table 
2 and Chart 1); 
- when adjusting merger activity to take inflation into account, both 
the 1979 total value of assets and the average size of the acquisition 
remain smaller in constant dollars than during the peak of the prior 
merger wave, but the recent trend toward "mega-deals" has probably 
increased the average size of acquisitions since 1979 (see Table 2); 
- when adjusting merger activity to account for growth in assets for the 
manufacturing and mining sector as a whole, data in 1979 show that 
merger and acquisition assets accounted for a smaller percentage of 
the total assets of all manufacturing and mining companies than 
in 1968 (See Table 3). 
23/ According to Grim, "persistent high interest rates and dwindling 
cash flows have led to an increase in both divestitures and sales of private 
concerns. Divestitures permit large corporations to redirect assets into 
the most productive areas of their business. Sales of private concerns are 
increasingly motivated by a desire for liquidity on the part of selling 
stockholders." See release, "Merger Upturn Persists: Third Quarter Up 25X." 
W.T. Grim & Co., Chicago, Illinois, October 21, 1981. 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of Assets Acquired in Large a/ 
Mining and Manufacturing Mergers by Type 
For Selected Years 1948-1979 
(percentages) - b/ 
Horizontal 38.8 36.6 27.3 13.3 11.4 
Vertical 23.8 11.5 20.1 23.8 8.9 
Conglomerate 37.5 51.9 52.6 62.9 79.7 
Product extension 37.5 45.7 33.5 37.8 49.9 
Market extension N A 2.7 5.0 8.0 8.7 
Other N A 3.6 14.2 17.1 21.2 
Horizontal 4.2 19.4 18.8 30.7 28.5 2.3 
Vertical 7.2 7.7 15.9 1.1 15.1 7.3 
Conglomerate 88.6 72.9 65.3 68.2 56.4 90.4 
Product Extension 39.0 31.7 13.3 22.6 28.0 35.9 
Market Extension 5.9 3.1 15.3 7.6 .O .O 
Other 43.6 38.1 36.7 38.0 28.4 54.2 
Source: Federal Trade Commission. 
a/ Acquired firms with assets of $10 million or more for which data are 
publi~ly available. 
b/ Percentages may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. - 
c/ Figures for 1979 are preliminary. - 
Note: It is possible that in any one year a small number of acquisitions 
of companies with large asset values could distort the data, however, the 
general trends observed are probably reasonably accurate. 
TABLE 2  
L a r g e  A c q u i s i t i o n s  i n  Manufac tu r ing  and Min ing ,  By Y e a r ,  1960-1979 
Average 
S i z e  o f  Average 
A s s e t s  A s s e t s  A c q u i s i t i o n  S i z e  o f  
( i n  m i l l i o n s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  A c q u i s i t i o n  
Number o f  o f  c u r r e n t  o f  c o n s t a n t  o f  c u r r e n t  ( i n  c o n s t a n t  
Year A c q u i s i t i o n s  d o l l a r s )  1972 d o l l a r s )  d o l l a r s )  1972 d o l l a r s )  
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  t 5  
S o u r c e :  Bureau o f  Economics,  F e d e r a l  Trade  Commission. Columns 3-5 
c a l c u l a t e d  by CRS. 
a /  Acquired f i r m s  w i t h  a s s e t s  o f  $10 m i l l i o n  o r  more.  - 
b /  F i g u r e s  f o r  1979 a r e  p r e l i m i n a r y .  - 
Note:  Not i n c l u d e d  i n  above t a b u l a t i o n  a r e  companies  f o r  which d a t a  a r e  
n o t  p u b l i c l y  a v a i l a b l e .  The d a t a  a r e  o n l y  f o r  l a r g e  min ing  and m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
companies  and t h e r e f o r e  d o  n o t  i n c l u d e  s e r v i c e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  which have been 
q u i t e  a c t i v e  i n  m e r g e r s  and a c q u i s i t i o n s .  The W.T.  rim d a t a ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  c o v e r  a l l  t y p e s  o f  m e r g e r s  and a c q u i s i t i o n s  and a r e  more c u r r e n t  
t h a n  t h e  FTC d a t a .  The Grim d a t a  show a  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
a v e r a g e  s i z e  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s  s i n c e  1979, p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  "mega-deals." I n  1981 t h e r e  were  12 such  d e a l s  o f  over  
$1 b i l l i o n  each  ( e q u i v a l e n t  t o  $530 m i l l i o n  i n  1972 d o l l a r s ) ,  compared 
w i t h  o n l y  4 such  t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  1980.  
CHART 1 
LARGE* MANUFACTURING 
AND MINING FIRMS ACQUIRED 
194801979 
UMBER OF FIRMS ACQUl 2oop-- 
($ Billions) 
'Firms with assets of $10 million or more. 
SOURCE: Buteou of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. 
Year 
TABLE 3 
To ta l .  Asse t s  o f  A l l  Large Manufacturing and Mining Companies 
Acquired a s  a  Percentage  o f  To ta l  Asse t s  
of  A l l  Manufacturing and Mining Corpora t ions ,  1960-1979 
A l l  Manufacturing Large b /  
and Mining Manuf ac turyng and 
~ o r ~ o r a t i o n s  a /  Mining ~ c ~ u i s i t i o n s  
T o t a l  Asse t s  To ta l  Asse t s  
( $  M i l l i o n s )  ( $  M i l l i o n s )  Percentage  
a /  F i g u r e s  f o r  Manufacturing and Mining Corporate  Asse ts  have been 
revisTd t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  use  of  F i r s t  Q u a r t e r  Q u a r t e r l y  F i n a n c i a l  Repor ts .  
b /  Acquired f i rms  wi th  a s s e t s  of  $10 m i l l i o n  o r  more. - 
c /  F i g u r e s  f o r  1979 a r e  p re l imina ry .  - 
Source:  Corpora te  Manufacturing Asse t s  ob ta ined  from Q u a r t e r l y  F inanc i a l  
Repor ts .  T o t a l s  f o r  Mining de r ived  from IRS S t a t i s t i c s  o f  Income f o r  1966 
through 1974, and from Q u a r t e r l y  F inanc i a l  Reports  t h e r e a f t e r .  Bureau o f  
Economics, Fede ra l  Trade Commission. 
There a r e  o t h e r  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  c u r r e n t  per iod  of  i nc reased  merger 
a c t i v i t y  and t h e  preceding  one. I n  t h e  l a t e  1960s,  r i s i n g  s t o c k  p r i c e s ,  which 
many a n a l y s t s  regarded  a s  " i n f l a t e d , "  p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  purchas ing  of  companies 
i n  exchange f o r  s t o c k  and c o n v e r t i b l e  deben tu re s  w i th  such s p e c u l a t i v e  enthusiasm 
t h a t  t h e s e  s t o c k s  and deben tu re s  were e u p h e m i s t i c a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
a s  "Chinese t r a d i n g  stcanps" and "Castro C o n v e r t i b l e s  ." - 241 By comparison,  i n  
t h e  c u r r e n t  wave of  merger and takeover  a c t i v i t y ,  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  g r e a t e r  pro- 
p o r t i o n  of  t h e  d e a l s  a r e  f o r  c a s h ,  whereby s t o c k  i s  purchased by t h e  b i d d e r  on a 
t ende r  o f f e r  b a s i s .  251 This  enab le s  t h e  h o s t i l e  o f f e r o r  t o  make h i s  o f f e r  -
qu ick ly  and d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  having t o  g e t  
approval  from t h e  company's board of  d i r e c t o r s ,  which would have t o  put  t h e  
m a t t e r  t o  a sha reho lde r  v o t e .  
While t h e  account ing  dev ices  which r e p o r t e d l y  boosted merger a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s have l a r g e l y  been r e v i s e d ,  some accoun t ing  i n c e n t i v e s  remain.  
There i s  s t i l l  a  p o t e n t i a l  "boots t rap"  e f f e c t  on e a r n i n g s  per  s h a r e  when mergers  
o c c u r ,  a l though t h i s  may be l e s s  impor tan t  i n  an atmosphere where an i n c r e a s i n g  
number of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  marke t  and have t h e  capac- 
i t y  t o  ana lyze  t h i s  in format ion .  Some i n c e n t i v e  t o  buy a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t i a l  in -  
t e r e s t  i n  ano the r  company, however, cames from t h e  e q u i t y  account ing  method, 
whereby a  company owning 20 pe rcen t  o f  ano the r  can i n c l u d e  a  p ro  r a t a  s h a r e  of 
t h e  l a t t e r ' s  e a r n i n g s  i n  i t s  own p r o f i t  s t a t e m e n t .  
24/  Phalon,  op. c i t . ,  p. 66. -
25/ According t o  W.T. Grim, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  n i n e  months of  1981, among the  
d e a l s f o r  which payment d a t a  a r e  d i s c l o s e d ,  cash  a c q u i s i t i o n s  comprised 42%,  
exchange of  s t o c k  35%, and combinat ions o f  c a s h / s t o c k  and/or  d e b t  22%. Data f o r  
1968 show t h a t ,  a t  t h e  h e i g h t  o f  t h e  l a s t  conglomerate merger wave, 29% of  t h e  
d e a l s  were f o r  c a s h ,  62% were f o r  s t o c k ,  and 9% were f o r  a  combinat ion of cash 
and s e c u r i t i e s .  
4. Cur ren t  Mot iva t ions  t o  Merge 
It appea r s  t h a t  t h e  major  impetus f o r  takeover  a c t i v i t y  now comes from a 
s e r i e s  o f  e v e n t s  r e l a t e d  t o  h igh  i n f l a t i o n  and h igh  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  F i r s t ,  
i n f l a t i o n  h a s  tended t o  make dep rec i a t ed  a s s e t  v a l u e s ,  a s  s e t  f o r t h  on t h e  books 
o f  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  less than  t h e i r  f a i r  market  o r  replacement  va lues .  Absence of  
robus t  growth i n  t h e  s t o c k  market f r e q u e n t l y  means t h a t  t h e  market  p r i c e  per  
s h a r e  i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  v a l u e  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  and even l e s s  t han  t h e i r  
d e p r e c i a t e d  book v a l u e .  For t h e  Standard and Poor ' s  400 i n d u s t r i a l s ,  t h e  aver- 
age  r a t i o  o f  market  t o  book va lue  was roughly 2  i n  1969; i t  h i t  a  h igh  i n  
1972 of  2.3 and then  dec l ined  t o  1 .1  i n  1974. 261 The average r a t i o  f o r  1980 -
was s t i l l  o n l y  1.2.  
During t h e  mid 1970s weakness i n  t h e  U.S. d o l l a r  r e l a t i v e  t o  f o r e i g n  cur-  
r e n c i e s  such  a s  t h e  Deutschmark and t h e  Swiss f r a n c  made f o r e i g n  purchase  of  
U.S. s e c u r i t i e s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  f o r e i g n  t akeove r s  o f  U.S. companies, r e l a t i v e l y  
more a t t r a c t i v e .  While h ighe r  U.S. i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  have s i n c e  somewhat moderated 
t h i s  t r e n d ,  h igh  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  have brought  c o r p o r a t e  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  r i s k  
new v e n t u r e s  and a  p re fe rence  f o r  purchas ing  ongoing b u s i n e s s e s  o r  proved 
r e s e r v e s .  
With t h e  c u r r e n t  soa r ing  i n f l a t i o n  and h igh  c o s t  of  b u i l d i n g  new 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e  f i n a l  complet ion c o s t  i s  not  known... Because o f  t h e  
c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n - - i . e . ,  t h e  h igh  y i e l d  from bonds and t h e  double  t a x  
on dividends--common s t o c k s  a r e  s e l l i n g  a t  much l e s s  t han  t h e i r  t r u e  
v a l u e ,  sometimes even l e s s  t han  t h e i r  book v a l u e .  The re fo re ,  i t  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  more a t t r a c t i v e  t o  acqu i r e  a  going bus ines s  t han  t o  a t tempt  
t o  b u i l d  a d d i t i o n a l  c a p a c i t y .  271 -
26/ Comments by Joseph H. P e r e l l a  a t  t h e  1979 American Bar Assoc i a t i on  
~ n n u a l ~ e e t i n ~ .  The Urge t o  Merge--Where Has It Come From and Where Is It 
Going? The Bus iness  Lawyer, A p r i l ,  1980. p. 1419-1421. (Th i s  meeting and 
p u b l i c a t i o n  h e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  ABA ~ e e t i n g . )  
271 Comments by Thomas M. Evans, ABA Meeting,  op. c i t  . , p .  1424-1425. -
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  was e s p e c i a l l y  e v i d e n t  i n  Mobil O i l  ' s  q u e s t  f o r  Marathon 
O i l .  The Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l  r epo r t ed  comments from two Wall S t r e e t  a n a l y s t s :  
A t akeover  of Marat.hon would be s imply ''a v e r y  good purchase" f o r  
Mobil. .  . Marathon's  s h a r e s  r e c e n t l y  had t r aded  a t  such low l e v e l s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  unde r ly ing  v a l u e  ... t h a t  a  t akeove r  " i s  an  opportu-  
n i t y . .  ." The c o s t  o f  f i n d i n g  o i l  i s  $12 t o  $15 a  b a r r e l .  By buying 
Marathon a t  $85 a  s h a r e ,  Mobil can  buy i t  a t  about  $3 t o  $3.50 pe r  
b a r r e l .  281 -
This  i s  no t  t o  sugges t  t h e  t o t a l  absence  o f  more t r a d i t i o n a l  m o t i v a t i o n s  
t o  merge o r  a c q u i r e ,  such a s :  
-a d e s i r e  t o  ach i eve  a  l a r g e  enough s i z e  t o  r e a l i z e  an economical s c a l e  
of  p roduct ion  and/or  d i s t r i b u t i o n ;  
-a d e s i r e  t o  d i v e r s i f y  t o  reduce  t h e  r i s k s  of  b u s i n e s s ;  
-a d e s i r e  t o  u t i l i z e  c e r t a i n  t a x  b e n e f i t s  which may be a v a i l a b l e  w i t h  mergers  
o r  c o r p o r a t e  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  
-a d e s i r e  t o  overcome c r i t i c a l  l a cks  i n  o n e ' s  own company by a c q u i r i n g  
t h e  n e c e s s a r y  complementary r e s o u r c e s ,  p a t e n t s ,  o r  f a c t o r s  
of  p roduc t ion ;  
-a d e s i r e  t o  ach i eve  s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e  t o  have e f f i c i e n t  a c c e s s  t o  c a p i t a l  
ma rke t s  o r  i nexpens ive  a d v e r t i s i n g ;  
-a d e s i r e  on t h e  p a r t  of managers t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  domain and t h e i r  
p r o f i t s ;  
-a d e s i r e  t o  respond t o  s h r i n k i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  growth and /o r  p r o f i t  
i n  o n e ' s  own i n d u s t r y  because  o f  s h r i n k i n g  demand o r  e x c e s s i v e  
compe t i t i on .  291 -
Indeed ,  t h e  v a r i e t y  of  t y p e s  of mergers  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  FTC and Grim 
undoubtedly i n d i c a t e  d i v e r s i t y  of  purpose.  But what d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  t h e  p r e s e n t  
merger wave from p r i o r  waves i s  a  s e t  o f  market  c o n d i t i o n s  which have encouraged 
l a r g e  and e s t a b l i s h e d  companies t o  engage i n  an unprecedented  number of  h o s t i l e  
a c q u i s i t i o n s .  G r i m  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  f o r  p u b l i c 1  y  t r a d e d  
281 B l u s t e i n ,  Pau l .  Mobi l ' s  Bid f o r  Marathon R e f l e c t s  Lessons from 
~ o n o c T 0 f  f e r ,  Urge t o  Gain Reserves .  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  November 4 ,  1981. 
291 See S t e i n e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 30 e t  seq .  -
companies in 1981 rose 42% to 75 from 53 a year earlier. This increase was 
accompanied by a rise in takeover battles. Among the 75 offers attempted 
during 1981, 28 or 37% were contested by the subject company's management, 
compared with 12 or 23% in 1980. This reflects the highest number of hostile 
tender offers that Grimm's research department has ever recorded. Of the 28 
target companies resisting takeover attempts, Grim notes that 15 were able 
to ward off their hostile suitors. But not all 15 remained independent- 
9 were taken over by "white knights." The period can best be summed up by the 
following statement by a prominent merger and acquisitions specialist at First 
Boston, a leading investment firm: 
... if you start with the premise that capital generally travels to 
areas of highest return where the smallest amount of attendant risk 
exists, and put that in the context of the figures [regarding the 
market price to book value ratios and the relative value of the dollar] ... perhaps you can better understand the explosion in cash merger and 
acquisition activity since 1974. ... a tremendous gap developed and 
still exists between the stock market value for 100 shares of stock 
and the underlying commercial value of an enterprise. ...y ou have the 
stock market down and lots of bargains around. The accountants passed 
rules making pooling more difficult, but no one really cares about 
pooling any more, with stocks selling way below book. Analysts used 
to be very nervous about goodwill, but that was pretty much reevalu- 
ated, and people began to care less about goodwill if they were paying 
more than book for stocks. When cash built up in the coffers of your 
so-called blue chip companies, they looked around and noticed that 
there was a Williams Act written that said if you want to make a 
takeover bid, this is how to do it. 
So you had the large, well-established, so-called AAA buyers 
looking not for the tun-around situations, but for quality, well- 
managed target companies. Therefore, [in] the last five years, you 
saw companies like Cargill, Clba-Geigy, International Nickel, Mobil 
Oil, Schlumberger, and Standard of Indiana launch unsolicited 
takeover efforts. - 30/ 
In the current hostile atmosphere, few companies faced with an unsolicited 
tender offer survive as independent companies z/ even though companies are 
301 Perella, op. cit., p. 1420. -
31/ The survival rate for domestic companies faced with a takeover via a 
tenderffer is small, but it is even smaller when foreign companies make tender 
offers for U.S. companies. See Winch, Corporate Mergers, op. cit., p. 14. 
employing a variety of defensive tactics to thwart raiders. Often the only 
possibility is to secure the protection of a "white knight," a company willing 
to purchase the target on terms arguably more favorable to it and usually with 
a provision to retain existing management. Yet, characteristic of this merger 
wave, shareholders may benefit greatly from premiums paid which are well above 
market price. 321 But the spectacle of large Fortune 500 companies attacking 
each other, counterattacking and maneuvering as if engaged in war games has 
raised public policy questions which go beyond the traditional antitrust and 
economic concentration questions raised in prior merger periods. 
In a somewhat skewed notion of the survival of the fittest, it is the well- 
managed firms which are frequently the targets. =/ At a time of concern over the 
competitive position and the rate of investment of U.S. industry, some cash-rich 
firms are moving to acquire in order to avoid being acquired. Questions of 
"fairness" arise at least as often as the traditional questions of whether a 
merger or acquisition will impede competition. When the tactics are so hostile, 
fairness-to management, shareholders, labor, pension fund recipients, the com- 
munity-is not easily defined but seems to be at the crux of the public policy 
debate. 
321 J.A. Morgan & Co., an Oak Brook, Illinois, member consulting firm, 
reporcd that the average price paid for profitable manufacturing companies 
increased to 13.9 times their earnings for the 12-month period ending in 
the 3rd quarter of 1981. This compares with a 13.7 price-earnings ratio 
paid in the second quarter of 1981 and a 10.3 ratio in the 1980 third quarter. 
(To illustrate the magnitude of the premium, the PIE for the Dow Jones Indus- 
trials was 7.2 on December 4, 1981.) Buyers were willing to pay the highest 
premiums ever above net worth. The median premium was 100% more than net 
worth, up from 40% in the preceding quarter and 50% in this year's first 
quarter. Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1981. 
331 Perella, op. cit., p. 1420. -
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11. THE TAKEOVER PROCESS: OFFENSIVE TACTICS 
A. S t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  Deal  
A  s e r i e s  of  i n n o v a t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  h a s  been used i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t o  ac- 
q u i r e  c o n t r o l  o f  p u b l i c  companies. Some examples a r e :  
... E d p e r ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  25 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  s t o c k  o f  Brascan on 
t h e  f l o o r  o f  t h e  American S tock  Exchange f o r  t h e  s o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  
between 30 and 50 i n s t i t u t i o n a l  h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  s t o c k .  The s econd ,  
and even more c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,  was Sun ' s  m idn igh t  r a i d ,  pu r suan t  
t o  which t h e y  acqu i r ed  35 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  s t o c k  of  Bec ton ,  D ick inson ,  
Th i rd  was t h e  h i g h l y  unusua l  o f f e r  r e c e n t l y  made by J . P .  Fuqua 
t o  a c q u i r e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  Hoover Company.. . .he  made an o f f e r  o n l y  t o  
members of  t h e  Hoover f a m i l y ,  who were sp read  t h roughou t  t h e  c o u n t r y  
and c o n t r o l l e d  app rox ima te ly  42 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  Hoover s t o c k .  341 -
While t a k e o v e r s  may be pursued by a  l i m i t l e s s  v a r i e t y  o f  t e c h n i q u e s ,  t h i s  sec-  
t i o n  e x p l o r e s  some of  t h e  b a s i c  and well-known o f f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  used by a  
h o s t i l e  o f f e r o r  (sometimes p e j o r a t i v e l y  known a s  a  " r a i d e r " )  t o  a c q u i r e  c o n t r o l  
of a  s u b j e c t  o r  " t a r g e t "  company through an u n s o l i c i t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  Any t ake -  
ove r  s i t u a t i o n  i s  dynamic,  w i th  many moving p a r t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a c t i o n s  by:  
- t h e  o f f e r o r ' s  management and i t s  inves tmen t  bank ing ,  l e g a l ,  bank ,  and 
p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  a d v i s o r s ;  
- t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  management, w i th  i t s  b a t t e r y  o f  i nves tmen t  bank ing ,  
l e g a l ,  bank ,  and p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  a d v i s o r s ;  
- t h e  inves tment  community, i n c l u d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s ,  t h e  
d i r e c t o r s  o f  s t o c k  exchanges on which i nvo lved  s e c u r i t i e s  a r e  
t r a d e d ,  t h e  a r b i t r a g e u r s ,  and t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  of t h e  
o f f e r o r  and s u b j e c t  companies ; 
341 Comments by Edward F. Greene ,  ABA Meet ing ,  op.  c i t .  p. 1443-1444. -
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- t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i nc lud ing  t h o s e  a t  t h e  SEC, t h e  FTC, t h e  
J u s t i c e  Department, t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve Board, t h e  Committee 
on Fore ign  Investment  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  
a g e n c i e s ,  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e ;  s/ 
- t h e  Fede ra l  and S t a t e  c o u r t s ;  
- t h e  Congress and S t a t e  and l o c a l  l e g i s l a t o r s ;  and 
- o t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ,  such a s  l a b o r  unions and pension fund 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a s  wel l  a s  pub l i c  i n t e r e s t  groups such a s  
consumer groups .  
While t h e r e  i s  no " typ i ca l "  takeover--each i n s t a n c e  may evoke a  change i n  
t a c t i c s  o r  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  a  new method--the fo l lowing  s e c t i o n s  provide  t h e  
mechanics o f  a  s i m p l i f i e d  takeover  example, no t ing  t h e  r o l e s  of  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  
par  t i e s .  
1. The O f f e r o r  Cons iders  a  Range of I s s u e s  
A company's management may form t h e  i dea  t o  i n i t i a t e  a  takeover  of  ano the r  
company from a  v a r i e t y  of  s o u r c e s ,  i nc lud ing  i t s  investment  banker ,  pe r sona l  
f r i e n d s  o f  management, i t s  l e g a l  counse l ,  o r  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o r p o r a t e  r e sea rch  
35/ T h i s  r e p o r t  d e a l s  wi th  j u s r i s d i c t i o n  exe rc i s ed  by t h e  SEC, FTC, and 
~ u s t i z  Department over  a l l  mergers  g e n e r a l l y ,  bu t  i t  does  not  cover  i nd iv id -  
ua l  agency o v e r s i g h t  i n  t h e  merger a r e a .  It should be noted t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  
s p e c i a l i z e d  s c r u t i n y  i s  r equ i r ed  by c e r t a i n  agenc i e s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s :  
e  .g . ,  t h e  Nuclear Regula tory  Commission must approve a c q u i s i t i o n s  o f  companies 
i n  t h e  energy f i e l d ;  t h e  Fede ra l  Energy Regula tory  Commission must approve com- 
b i n a t i o n s  of  i n t e r s t a t e  e l e c t r i c  and gas  u t i l i t i e s ;  and t h e  Fede ra l  Communica- 
t i o n s  Commission must approve a c q u i s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  communications f i e l d .  The 
Committee on Fore ign  Investment i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  (CFIUS), an in te r -agency  
body e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  execu t ive  branch and led  by t h e  Treasury  Department, 
i s  charged wi th  guard ing  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  inves tments  which a r e  not  i n  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  I t s  ove r s igh t  powers a r e  l i m i t e d ,  however, as evidenced by 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t s  J u l y  1981 reques t  t o  t h e  French government t o  d e l a y  t h e  ac; , 
q u i s i t i o n  o f  an American f i rm   exas as gulf) by a  state-owned French f i rm  ( ~ o c i e t e  
Na t iona l e  E l f  Aqu i t a ine )  was ignored .  
e f f o r t s  o f  i t s  own in-house f i n a n c i a l  a d v i s o r y  s t a f f .  The d e a l  i s  r e sea rched  
and s t r u c t u r e d  t o  t a k e  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  such m a t t e r s  a s  : 
- t h e  t a x  and account ing  e f f e c t s  o f  v a r i o u s  means o f  e f f e c t i n g  t h e  
combinat ion ; 
- t h e  b e s t  s t r a t e g y  f o r  accomplishing t h e  t akeove r  ( e . g .  n e g o t i a t e d  
a c q u i s i t i o n ,  u n s o l i c i t e d  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  q u a n t i t y  o f  s t o c k  needed 
t o  a s s u r e  c o n t r o l ,  t e rms  of  t h e  d e a l  needed t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  
a r b i t r a g e u r s  w i l l  p rovide  l i q u i d i t y  f o r  t h e  d e a l ) ;  
- t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n s t rumen t s  t o  use i n  t h e  d e a l  ( e . g . ,  t e n d e r  f o r  
s t o c k ,  c a s h ,  d e b t ,  o r  some combina t ion  o f  t h e s e ) ;  
- t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  merger i n  te rms  of  inves tment  a d v i s o r y ,  l e g a l ,  and 
p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  f e e s ;  
- t h e  premium neces sa ry  t o  ensu re  t h a t  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  goa l  i s  met 
( e  . g .  , t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  such a s  s h a r e h o l d e r s  and a r b i t r a g e u r s  w i l l  
e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  d e a l ) ;  
- t h e  r i s k  and f i n a n c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  a  b i d d i n g  war w i th  a  r i v a l ;  
- t h e  methods o f  meet ing  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r equ i r emen t s  f o r  t h e  d e a l  ( e . g . ,  
from i n t e r n a l l y  gene ra t ed  funds from bank l o a n s  o r  from newly 
i s sued  s e c u r i t i e s )  ; 
- t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  making t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  a s  opposed t o  u s ing  
t h e  funds f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  inves tment  pu rposes ;  and 
- t h e  l e g a l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  proposed d e a l  ( e . g . ,  t h e  r i s k  of 
v i o l a t i n g  a n t i t r u s t  o r  SEC o r  S t a t e  d i s c l o s u r e  l aws ) .  
2 .  The S p e c i a l  Role of  A r b i t r a g e u r s  
Among t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e s e  d i v e r s e  p a r t i e s ,  some ment ion  
should be made of  t h e  r o l e  o f  r i s k  a r b i t r a g e u r s ,  - 361 whose p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
361 "Risk" a r b i t r a g e  d i f f e r s  from t h e  more c l a s s i c  " r i s k l e s s "  a r b i t r a g e  i n  
t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  i nvo lves  t h e  purchase  o f  a  s e c u r i t y  and t h e  s imul taneous  o r  
n e a r l y  s imul taneous  s a l e  of  an e q u i v a l e n t  o r  r e l a t e d  s e c u r i t y  a t  a  s l i g h t l y  
h ighe r  p r i c e .  See d e f i n i t i o n s  i n w e l l e s ,  C h r i s .  I n s i d e  t h e  A r b i t r a g e  
Game. I n s t i t u t i o n a l  I n v e s t o r ,  August 1981. p .  41-57. 
can  a f f e c t  t h e  outcome of  a  proposed takeover  d e a l ;  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e i r  r o l e  a l s o  
a f f o r d s  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g y  of  t h e  d e a l .  I n  i t s  most s imple  
form, r i s k  a r b i t r a g e  i nvo lves  t h e  o u t r i g h t  purchase  of  s e c u r i t i e s  i n  a  company 
t h a t  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  a  planned r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  most commonly a  merger ,  ex- 
change o f f e r ,  c a s h  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  o r  l i q u i d a t i o n .  A r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  g roup  of 
h i g h l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s p e c i a l i s t s  c a l l e d  t h e  " p r o f e s s i o n a l  a r b i t r a g e u r s "  dominates  
t h i s  f i e l d ,  a l t hough  an i n c r e a s i n g  number o f  "amateur a r b i t r a g e u r s , "  made up of  
t h e  i n v e s t i n g  p u b l i c  and r e t a i l  s t o c k  b r o k e r s ,  h a s  jo ined  i n  t h e  sphe re  o f  mer- 
g e r  s p e c u l a t i o n  su r round ing  "deal  s t o c k s , "  which a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  announced o r  
a n t i c i p a t e d  t a k e o v e r s .  According t o  t h e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  I n v e s t o r ,  i n  t h e  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  s m a l l  number o f  b i l l i o n - d o l l a r  d e a l s ,  t h e  a r b i t r a g e u r s '  r o l e  may be 
mino r ,  but i n  t h e  much more common $100 m i l l i o n  t o  $500 m i l l i o n  d e a l s ,  espec-  
i a l l y  t h o s e  i nvo lv ing  r i v a l  b i d d e r s ,  a r b i t r a g e u r s  ( a r b s )  o f t e n  come t o  c o n t r o l  
30 t o  40 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  s t o c k .  
Once a  s t o c k  becomes a  d e a l  s t o c k ,  s ays  one mba (merger and 
a c q u i s i t i o n )  c h i e f ,  t h e  r e g u l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  g e t  ou t  o f  t h e  
s t o c k  and t h e  a r b i t r a g e  community t a k e s  t h e i r  p l a c e .  The a r b s  
t hen  s e t  t h e  marke t .  So you have t o  c a t e r  t o  t h e i r  t a s t e s .  371 -
The of  f e r o r  must gauge what "premium1'--the d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  market  
p r i c e  of t h e  s h a r e s  i n  a  company i t  wishes t o  a c q u i r e  and t h e  merger o f f e r i n g  
p r i ce - - i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  mo t iva t e  a  s u f f i c i e n t  number of  i n v e s t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a r -  
b i t r a g e u r s ,  t o  t e n d e r  t h e i r  s h a r e s  t o  t h e  o f f e r o r .  A f t e r  an announcement o f  a 
t e n d e r  o f f e r  , t h e  a r b i t r a g e u r s  may buy s t o c k  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t  company, depending 
on t h e i r  assessment  of  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  d e a l ,  which i s  based on a  combinat ion of  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  premium i f  t h e  d e a l  i s  consunrmanted and t h e  r i s k  
f a l l  th rough.  A l s o ,  g e n e r a l l y  speak ing ,  t h e  more a r b i t r a g e u r s  
d e a l ,  t h e  more l i k e l i h o o d  of s u c e s s s ,  s i n c e  t hey  a r e  much more 
t h a t  t h e  d e a l  w i l l  
t h e r e  a r e  i n  t h e  
l i k e l y  t o  t ende r  
371 Wel l e s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 51. -
t h e i r  s h a r e s  t h a n  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  i n v e s t o r s  such a s  management and employee 
groups t h a t  may own c o n s i d e r a b l e  b locks  of  s t o c k .  The v a l u e  of  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a -  
t i o n  stems from t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  u n l e s s  t h e  t a r g e t e d  amount of  s h a r e s  needed t o  
g a i n  c o n t r o l  is  a c t u a l l y  t ende red ,  t h e  d e a l  w i l l  c o l l a p s e .  The a r b i t r a g e u r s '  
m o t i v a t i o n s  may be summed up: 
The p r o f i t s  i n  r i s k  a r b i t r a g e ,  of  c o u r s e ,  d e r i v e  from t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  o r  spread  between t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  s t o c k  fo l lowing  
t h e  announcement of  a  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  and t h e  v a l u e  u l t i m a t e 1  y  
r e a l i z e d  by sha reho lde r s  when t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  completed.  
The r i s k  i n  r i s k  a r b i t r a g e  d e r i v e s  from t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  
t r a n s a c t i o n  w i l l  no t  be  completed. Between t h e  announcement -
and t h e  complet ion of a  d e a l ,  t h e  s t o c k  w i l l  t end  t o  t r a d e  some- 
where between i t s  pre-announcement p r i c e  and t h e  e s t i m a t e d  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  d e a l  t o  t h e  sha reho lde r s .  I f  t h e  d e a l  i s  t e r m i n a t e d ,  t h e  
s t o c k  w i l l  u s u a l l y  d rop  p r e c i p i t o u s l y  t o  pre-announcement l e v e l s  
[emphasis  t h e i r s ] .  - 381 
Thus, s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  d e a l  so a s  t o  be a t t r a c t i v e  t o  t h e  a r b i t r a g e u r s ,  es-  
p e c i a l l y  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a r b i t r a g e u r s ,  can  be impor t an t .  The a r b i t r a g e u r s  
va lue  more h i g h l y  d e a l s  i n  which t h e r e  i s  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  a l l  t h e  s h a r e s  t hey  
purchase  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  be t ende red ,  a l though some d e a l s  a r e ,  f o r  o t h e r  f inan-  
c i a l  r ea sons ,  s t r u c t u r e d  so a s  t o  put a  c e i l i n g  on t h e  number of  s h a r e s  an of -  
f e r e r  w i l l  exchange. I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t endered  s h a r e s  a r e  p r o  r a t e d .   o or exam- 
p l e ,  U.S .  S t e e l  made a  t ende r  o f f e r  f o r  30 m i l l i o n  s h a r e s  o r  51 pe rcen t  o f  
Marathon's  s h a r e s .  Ninety percent  of  Marathon's  s h a r e s  were t ende red ,  s o  f o r  each 
s h a r e  t ende red ,  t h e  sha reho lde r  r ece ived  51 /90 ths ,  o r  t h e  v a l u e  o f  approximate ly  
56 s h a r e s  f o r  each 100 t ende red . )  When an o f f e r o r  o f f e r s  te rms  o t h e r  t han  ca sh ,  
such a s  c o n v e r t i b l e  p r e f e r r e d  s t o c k  o r  bonds,  t h e  a r b i t r a g e u r s  w i l l  v a l u e  t he  
d e a l  d i f f e r e n t l y .  T h e i r  r o l e  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  succes s  or  
f a i l u r e  of a  d e a l  should be noted .  
381 Wel les ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 42. -
3. The O f f e r o r  Buys an  I n i t i a l  Block of t h e  S u b j e c t ' s  S tock  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  o f f e r o r  d e c i d e s  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f a v o r a b l e  f o r  going fo r -  
ward w i th  an a c q u i s i t i o n ,  he  may beg in  t h e  m u l t i - s t e p  p r o c e s s  a l r e a d y  r e f e r r e d  
t o :  t h e  o f f e r o r  f i r s t  buys a  b lock  of s t o c k ,  t hen  makes a  t ende r  o f f e r  and 
f i n a l l y  fo l l ows  up w i th  a  n e g o t i a t e d  a c q u i s i t i o n  t o  "mop up1' t h e  d e a l .  Of 
c o u r s e ,  t h e  o f f e r o r  may s k i p  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  and go d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  t ende r  
o f f e r  s t a g e ,  b u t  s i n c e  t h e  o f f e r o r  a lmost  always wants  100 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  t a r g e t ,  
which i s  v i r t u a l l y  imposs ib l e  t o  o b t a i n  through a  t e n d e r  o f f e r ,  a  mop-up d e a l  i s  
g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e d .  A company contempla t ing  a  takeover  may f i r s t  buy a  b lock  of 
s t o c k  f o r  a  number of r e a s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g :  391 -
( 1 )  t o  u t i l i z e  e q u i t y  accoun t ing ,  which e n a b l e s  a  company purchas ing  
20 p e r c e n t  o f  ano the r  company's s t o c k  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  i t s  e a r n i n g s  
a  p ro - r a t a  s h a r e  of  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  e a r n i n g s  ( a l t hough  purchase  of 5 
pe rcen t  o r  more r e q u i r e s  an SEC b e n e f i c i a l  ownership 13D f i l i n g  o r ,  
i f  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  i s  t h e  i n t e n t ,  an SEC t e n d e r  o f f e r  14D-1 f i l i n g ;  
s e e  fo l l owing  s e c t i o n  f o r  d e t a i l s ) ;  
( 2 )  t o  g a i n  a  f o o t h o l d ,  p o s s i b l y  even a  s e a t  on t h e  board of  d i r e c t o r s ,  
and t h u s  ach i eve  more s t and ing  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  w i th  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  
management about  an a c q u i s i t i o n ;  
( 3 )  t o  t e s t  t h e  market  t o  g e t  a  f e e l  f o r  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e ;  
( 4 )  t o  p rov ide  "nega t i ve  c o n t r o l  ," whereby, a s  a  l a r g e  s t o c k h o l d e r ,  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r o r  could a t tempt  t o  b lock  management from employing 
a  v a r i e t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e  " sha rk - r epe l l en t "  t a c t i c s  such a s  : 
- i s s u i n g  more s h a r e s  t o  d i l u t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r o r ' s  h o l d i n g s ;  
- merging wi th  ano the r  company r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  a  "white  kn ight" ;  
- buying a  company which w i l l  p r e s e n t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r o r  
wi th  a n t i t r u s t  c o n f l i c t s ,  e t c .  ( ~ o t e :  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  
w i l l  be d i s cus sed  f u r t h e r  i n  a  subsequent  s e c t i o n ) ;  and 
( 5 )  t o  provide  some in su rance  a g a i n s t  l o s s e s  i n  t h e  event  t h a t  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r o r  does  make a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  bu t  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  
goes t o  a  r i v a l  h ighe r  b idde r  ( i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  o f f e r o r ' s  
s t o c k  w i l l  be tendered  a t  a  p r o f i t ) .  
39/ See Pha lon ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 33, 78 ,  92. -
B. Mergers and A c q u i s i t i o n s :  S e c u r i t i e s  Regu la t i ons  
1.  SEC J u r i s d i c t i o n  Over an  I n i t i a l  Purchase  of  a  Block o f  S tock  
S e c t i o n  13 (d )  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  and Exchange Act of  1934, a s  amended by 
t h e  Wil l iams Act of  1968, r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a  Schedule 13D form be f i l e d  w i th  t h e  
SEC, wi th  t h e  s u b j e c t  o r  t a r g e t  company, and wi th  each exchange on which t h e  
s u b j e c t ' s  s e c u r i t i e s  a r e  t r a d e d ,  w i t h i n  10 days a f t e r  any person  o r  group ac- 
q u i r e s  " b e n e f i c i a l  ownership" of 5 percent  o r  more o f  a  c l a s s  o f  r e g i s t e r e d  
e q u i t y  s e c u r i t i e s .  401 The Schedule 13D must d i s c l o s e ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  -
source  of  funds f o r  t h e  acqui red  s e c u r i t i e s ,  t h e  purpose o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  and 
t h e  p u r c h a s e r ' s  f u t u r e  p l ans  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  c o n t r o l  of  t h e  s u b j e c t  o r  t a r g e t .  
I f  t h e  purchases  a r e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  a c q u i r o r ' s  p o s i t i o n  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of 
merger n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  it must be  d i s c l o s e d  t h a t  a  p o s s i b l e  merger  w i l l  be  con- 
s i d e r e d .  I f  t h e  purpose of  t h e  purchase i s  t o  f r u s t r a t e  a  t akeove r  by a  t h i r d  
p a r t y ,  d i s c l o s u r e  of  t h a t  f a c t  must a l s o  be  made. 411 - 
Sec t ion  13 (d )  o f  t h e  Williams Act has  been c r i t i c i z e d  on t h e  grounds t h a t  
some companies have made l a r g e  a d d i t i o n a l  accumula t ions  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  s t ock  
du r ing  t h e  10-day "window" per iod  p r i o r  t o  f i l i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  Schedule 13D., and 
have thus  i nc reased  t h e i r  l eve rage  over  t h e  s u b j e c t  company d e s p i t e  SEC f i l i n g  
requi rements ,  which a r e  intended t o  d i s c l o s e  such a c t i o n s .  E a r l y  i n  1980, SEC 
401 Requirements a r e  o u t l i n e d  i n  Katcher ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 4-7 e t  seq .  -
41/  See Katcher  f o r  b e n e f i c i a l  ownership f i l i n g  requi rements  f o r  i n s t i t u -  
t i o n a r i n v e s t o r s  and members of  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  p r o f e s s i o n  such a s  b roke r -dea l e r s  
and r i s k  a r b i t r a g e u r s  who t a k e  p o s i t i o n s  i n  a  s t o c k  wi th  no i n t e n t i o n  o f  
ga in ing  c o n t r o l .  C e r t a i n  of  t h e s e  ( a s  we l l  a s  b e n e f i c i a l  owners who had 
acqui red  not  more t h a n  2  pe rcen t  o f  a  c l a s s  of  s e c u r i t i e s  w i t h i n  a  12-month 
pe r iod )  may f i l e  a  Schedule 1 3 G  which i s  an abb rev ia t ed  Schedule 13D. Op. c i t . ,  
p .  4-10, e t  s eq .  
Commissioner Harold Wil l iams proposed amendments t o  t h e  Wil l iams Act t o  
c o r r e c t  t h e s e  perce ived  abuses .  421 These amendments, which have never  been en- 
a c t e d ,  would, among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  " c lo se  t h e  10-day window per iod  by r e q u i r i n g  
t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  owning 5 pe rcen t  of  a  company make pub l i c  announcement w i th in  
1 b u s i n e s s  day a f t e r  r each ing  t h e  5 pe rcen t  l e v e l ,  f i l e  a  Schedule 13D wi th in  
5 bus ines s  days ,  and r e f r a i n  from making f u r t h e r  purchases  u n t i l  2  bus ines s  days 
a f t e r  t h e  f i l i n g  i s  made." 431 Opponents o f  t h e  proposed amendments a rgue  t h a t  
d e l a y s  i n  a b i l i t y  t o  purchase s e c u r i t i e s  and more cumbersome r e p o r t i n g  r equ i r e -  
ments w i l l  i n t e r f e r e  wi th  smooth func t ion ing  of  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  marke ts .  
I n  t h e  fas t -moving  merger p roces s ,  t h e  t iming  f o r  amending Schedule 13D may 
be impor t an t .  Amendments a r e  r equ i r ed  t o  be  made "promptly" (no time i n t e r v a l  
s p e c i f i e d )  i f  any "mater ia l"  change occu r s  i n  t h e  f a c t s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  Schedule 
and/or  i f  changes occur  i n  b e n e f i c i a l  ownership equa l  t o  one percent  o r  more of  
t h e  c l a s s .  Proposed amendments would have r equ i r ed  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  t o  be f i l e d  
w i t h i n  5 b u s i n e s s  days o f  t h e s e  changes and would have r equ i r ed  pu rchase r s  t o  
r e f r a i n  from making a d d i t i o n a l  purchases u n t i l  two bus ines s  days a f t e r  f i l i n g  
t h e  amendment. 
2. The O f f e r o r  Makes a  Tender O f f e r  and T r i g g e r s  Add i t i ona l  SEC Overs ight  
The next  s t e p  i n  t h e  takeover  process  occurs  when a  p o t e n t i a l  o f f e r o r  
f i n a l i z e s  h i s  p l ans  t o  make a  takeover  b i d .  The fo l lowing  d i s c u s s i o n  assumes 
42/ I n  response  t o  a  r eques t  from members o f  t h e  Senate  Banking Committee 
SEC ~ G i s s i o n e r  Harold Wil l iams t r a n s m i t t e d  a  l e t t e r  on February 15,  1980, and 
s h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  s e n t  a  d r a f t  o f  a  proposed b i l l  t o  amend t h e  Wil l iams Act .  
Both t h e  l e t t e r  and t h e  proposed b i l l  were r e p r i n t e d  i n  S e c u r i t i e s  Reg. & L .  Rep. 
(BNA) Spec. Supp. 2 ,  February 17,  1980, and Spec. Supp. 20, February 27, 1980. 
See Fogelson,  James H . ,  Joanne R. Wenig and Br ian  P. Friedman. Changing t h e  
Takeover Game: The S e c u r i t i e s  and Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments t o  
t h e  Wil l iams Act.  Harvard Jou rna l  on L e g i s l a t i o n ,  Vol. 17 ,  Winter  1980. 
( H e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  Fogelson e t  a1 .) p. 410. 
43/  Katcher ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 4-9. See a l s o  Fogelson,  e t  a l .  -
he has  chosen t o  fo l l ow up h i s  i n i t i a l  purchase  w i th  an u n s o l i c i a t e d  t ende r  
o f f e r  f o r  a l l  o r  a  c o n t r o l l i n g  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  s e c u r i t i e s .  
The Wil l iams Act r e g u l a t e s  takeover  b i d s  i n  fou r  ways; i t :  
( 1 )  r e q u i r e s  d i s c l o s u r e  through s t a t e m e n t s  f i l e d  w i th  t h e  SEC and 
c i r c u l a t e d  t o  i n v e s t o r s ;  
( 2 )  p r e s c r i b e s  s u b s t a n t i v e  requi rements  a s  t o  t h e  form and c o n t e n t  o f  
o f f e r s  ; 
( 3 )  p l a c e s  c o n t r o l s  over  recommendations a s  t o  t ende r  o f f e r s ;  and 
( 4 )  c o n t a i n s  a  broad a n t i f r a u d  p r o v i s i o n .  %/ 
Tender o f f e r  r u l e s  have been r e v i s e d  a  number o f  t imes .  Current  r u l e s  
which became e f f e c t i v e  January  7 ,  1980, a r e  grouped i n t o  two c a t e g o r i e s ,  
Regula t ions  14D and 14E. Both r e g u l a t i o n s  app ly  t o  t ende r  o f f e r s  f o r  any 
c l a s s  of  e q u i t y  s e c u r i t y  i s s u e d  by a  r e g i s t e r e d  p u b l i c  company. I f  t h e  
t ende r  o f f e r o r  seeks  s e c u r i t i e s  o t h e r  than  t h a t  of  a  r e g i s t e r e d  company, 
on ly  Regula t ion  14E a p p l i e s .  B r i e f l y ,  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  main p r o v i s i o n s :  %/ 
Regu la t ion  14-D 
Rule 14d-3 r e q u i r e s  t h e  b idde r  t o  f i l e  w i th  t h e  SEC and d i s s e m i n a t e  
t o  t h e  s u b j e c t  company, any o t h e r  b i d d e r ,  and any n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t i e s  
exchange o r  t h e  Nat iona l  Assoc i a t i on  of  S e c u r i t i e s  D e a l e r s ,  a  Tender 
O f f e r  S ta tement  on Schedule 14D-1 f i v e  days  a f t e r  t h e  commencement 
d a t e  of  t h e  o f f e r .  
This  14D-1 f i l i n g  r e q u i r e s  much more i n fo rma t ion  than  was r e q u i r e d  by 
Schedule 13D (used  t o  r e p o r t  b e n e f i c i a l  ownership of 5 pe rcen t  o f  a  
c l a s s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s ) .  I tems on Schedule 14D-1 c a l l  f o r  d i s c l o s u r e  
o f  t h e  b i d d e r ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  and any ar rangements  
between t h e  b idde r  and t h e  t a r g e t  company and t h e i r  o f f i c e r s  and 
d i r e c t o r s ,  and t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  laws and margin  
requi rements .  These must be d i s c l o s e d  i f  t h e y  a r e  m a t e r i a l  t o  
a  d e c i s i o n  by a  s e c u r i t y  ho lde r  whether t o  s e l l ,  t e n d e r  o r  ho ld  s e c u r i t i e s  
be ing  sought  i n  t h e  t ende r  o f f e r .  Also ,  i n fo rma t ion  such a s  l o a n  
agreements  t o  f i nance  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  must be  provided .  
441 Wander, Herber t  S. The E f f e c t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  Laws on Various 
~ c ~ u i x t i o n  Methods, P a r t  2, ALI-ABA Course M a t e r i a l s  J o u r n a l ,  Vol. 5 ,  
February  1981. p. 86. 
45/ The fo l lowing  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  Regu la t i ons  14D and 14E i s  l a r g e l y  
e x c e r F e d  from Wander, op. c i t . ,  p. 87-90, b u t  i n c l u d e s  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  Katcher  
op. c i t . ,  as w e l l .  
Rule 14d-2 d e f i n e s  t h e  commencement d a t e  f o r  t h e  t ende r  o f f e r ,  a  key 
concept  under t h e  new r u l e s .  An o f f e r  i s  commenced by p r e s s  r e l e a s e ,  
newspaper adve r t i s emen t  o r  o t h e r  pub l i c  s t a t emen t  made by t h e  b idde r  
o r  on h i s  beha l f  which ( i )  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  b i d d e r  and t h e  s u b j e c t  com- 
pany and ( i i )  s t a t e s  t h e  amount and c l a s s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  be ing  sought 
i n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  and t h e  p r i c e  o r  r ange  of p r i c e s  be ing  o f f e r e d .  
But no t ende r  o f f e r  w i l l  be deemed t o  have commenced i f ,  w i t h i n  f i v e  
b u s i n e s s  days ,  t h e  b idde r  i s s u e s  an announcement t h a t  i t  i s  no t  con- 
t i n u i n g  wi th  t h e  o f f e r .  
Rule 14d-1 d e a l s  w i th  t h e  scope o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  of  t ende r  o f f e r s  and 
p rov ides  a  d e f i n i t i o n a l  framework t o  c l a r i f y  terms.  
Rule 14d-9 s t a t e s  t h a t  no s o l i c i t a t i o n  t o  s e c u r i t y  h o l d e r s  may be  made 
by any person  o t h e r  t han  t h e  b idde r  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  r u l e  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  
a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  u n l e s s  t h a t  person f i l e s  w i th  t h e  SEC a  Tender Of fe r  S o l i c i -  
tation-Recomnendation Statement  on Schedule 14D-9 on t h e  d a t e  such 
s o l i c i t a t i o n  i s  f i r s t  s e n t  t o  s e c u r i t y  h o l d e r s .  Minimum in fo rma t ion  
r equ i r emen t s  a r e  s t i p u l a t e d  by t h i s  r u l e  and d i s c l o s u r e  requi rements  a r e  
covered by Rule 14d-6. 
Regu la t i on  14E 
Rule 14e-1 r e q u i r e s  any t ende r  o f f e r  t o  remain open f o r  a  minimum of 
20 b u s i n e s s  days  from t h e  d a t e  i t  i s  f i r s t  publ i shed  o r  s e n t  t o  s e c u r i t y  
h o l d e r s .  Also ,  t h e  o f f e r  must remain open a t  l e a s t  t e n  days fo l lowing  
n o t i c e  o f  an i n c r e a s e  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  o f f e r e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o r  t h e  d e a l e r ' s  
s o l i c i t i n g  f e e .  The c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  tendered  s e c u r i t i e s  must be 
paid o r  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  r e tu rned  "promptly" a f t e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o r  with- 
drawal  of  t h e  o f f e r .  
Rule 14e-2 i n t e r r e l a t e s  wi th  Rule 14d-9 and r e q u i r e s  t h e  t a r g e t  com- 
pany t o  p u b l i s h  o r  send n o t i c e  o f  i t s  p o s i t i o n  concern ing  t h e  o f f e r  t o  
s e c u r i t y  h o l d e r s  w i th in  t e n  days of  t h e  o f f e r ' s  commencement. This  
p o s i t i o n  should t a k e  one o f  s e v e r a l  forms: a  recommendation t o  accept  
o r  r e j e c t  t h e  b i d d e r ' s  o f f e r ;  a  s t a t emen t  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t  company i s  ex- 
p r e s s i n g  no op in ion  and i s  remaining n e u t r a l  toward t h e  b i d d e r ' s  o f f e r ;  
o r  a  s t a t emen t  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t  company i s  unable  t o  t ake  a  p o s i t i o n  wi th  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  b i d d e r ' s  o f f e r .  
When t h e  Wil l iams Act was passed ,  Congress dec l ined  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  term 
" t ende r  o f f e r  ." Many have argued t h a t  t h e  dynamic n a t u r e  of  t ende r  o f f e r s  and 
t h e  need f o r  t h e  SEC t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  Wil l iams Act i n  a  f l e x i b l e  manner pre-  
c lude  p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n .  I n  terms of  conven t iona l  usage ,  one commentator 
n o t e s  t h a t  a  t ende r  o f f e r  may be cons idered  t o  be ''a p u b l i c l y  made i n v i t a t i o n  
addressed t o  a l l  sha reho lde r s  o f  a  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  t ende r  t h e i r  s h a r e s  f o r  s a l e  
a t  a  s p e c i f i e d  p r i ce . "  46/  But ,  g iven  t h e  i n n o v a t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  -
i n d u s t r y ,  w i th  i t s  wide v a r i e t y  of  open market and p r i v a t e  purchase methods t o  
a c q u i r e  s e c u r i t i e s  ( w i t h  o r  wi thout  p u b l i c  announcements),  t h e r e  would have t o  
be c o n s i d e r a b l e  ambigui ty  concern ing  when a  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r .  
C u r r e n t l y ,  a  combinat ion o f  j u d i c i a l  p recedent  and SEC rulemaking produces an 
evo lv ing  d e f i n i t i o n  of  a  t ende r  o f f e r .  
The February  1980 proposed amendments t o  t h e  Wil l iams Act a l s o  inc luded  a  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " t ende r  o f f e r "  t h a t  would make t h e  formal  t e n d e r  o f f e r  p r o v i s i o n s  
of t h e  Wil l iams Act g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o f  t e n  pe rcen t  o r  more 
o f  a  company's e q u i t y  s e c u r i t i e s  and t o  most a c q u i s i t i o n s  by pe r sons ,  i n c l u d i n g  
o f f i c e r s  and d i r e c t o r s ,  who have p rev ious ly  acqu i r ed  a  10 p e r c e n t  p o r t i o n .  The 
proposed d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t ende r  o f f e r  would invo lve  a  two- t i e r  approach and an 
o f f e r  would c o n s t i t u t e  a  t ende r  o f f e r  i f  i t  were t o  meet t h e  t e s t  i n  e i t h e r  
t i e r :  47/  -
( 1 )  Under t h e  f i r s t  t i e r ,  t h e  term " tender  o f f e r "  would c o n s i s t  o f :  
-one o r  more o f f e r s  t o  purchase ,  o r  s o l i c i t a t i o n s  o f  o f f e r s  t o  
s e l l ,  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  a  s i n g l e  c l a s s  
-during any 45-day per iod  
-d i r ec t ed  t o  more than  t e n  persons  and seeking  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  more t han  f i v e  pe rcen t  of t h e  c l a s s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s .  
( 2 )  Under t h e  second t i e r ,  one o r  more o f f e r s  t o  pu rchase ,  o r  
s o l i c i t a t i o n s  o f  o f f e r s  t o  s e l l ,  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  a  s i n g l e  c l a s s  
would be a  t ende r  o f f e r  i f :  
- the  o f f e r s  o r  t h e  s o l i c i t a t i o n s  a r e  d i s semina t ed  i n  a widespread 
manner ; 
- the  p r i c e  o f f e r e d  r e p r e s e n t s  a  premium i n  exces s  o f  t h e  g r e a t e r  
of 5 pe rcen t  o r  $2 above t h e  c u r r e n t  market  p r i c e  o f  t h e  se- 
c u r i t i e s  be ing  sought ;  and 
- the  o f f e r s  do not  provide  f o r  a  meaningfu l  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  t h e  p r i c e  and terms--thus t r u l y  n e g o t i a t e d  pu rchases  
of  s e c u r i t i e s  would not  be  r e g u l a t e d  a s  a  t ende r  o f f e r  under 
t h e  second t i e r .  
46/ See d i s c u s s i o n  i n  Fogelson e t  a l . ,  p. 429,  n o t e  101. -
47/ Excerpted from Wander, op.  c i t  ., p. 91. -
Debate i n  Congress on t h e s e  proposed amendments was v igo rous ,  proponents  
a rgu ing  f o r  t h e  need t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  prevent  abuses and opponents  
a rguing  t h a t  o t h e r  abuses would r e s u l t  from an approach which a l l e g e d l y  re -  
moves f l e x i b i l i t y  from t h e  SEC. While c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  var -  
i ous  arguments f o r  and a g a i n s t  t h e s e  proposed amendments i s  beyond t h e  scope 
o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  r e p o r t ,  t h e  p roposa l s  a r e  a i r e d  t o  provide  a  s ense  of  t h e  com- 
p l e x i t y  and con t rove r sy  sur rounding  c u r r e n t  SEC moni tor ing  of t h e  merger and 
takeover  p roces s .  
3. A Tender O f f e r  May Be Sub jec t  t o  S t a t e  Takeover Laws and t o  S t a t e  
Court  Review and I s  Sub jec t  t o  F e d e r a l  Court  Review 
The t r a d e  j ou rna l  Mergers and A c q u i s i t i o n s  r epo r t ed  t h a t ,  a s  of mid- 
1981, 37 s t a t e s  had enacted t ende r  o f f e r  laws. 481 Some S t a t e  s t a t u t e s  d e f i n e  -
a  " tender  o f f e r "  a s  any o f f e r  f o r  more than  a  s p e c i f i e d  percentage  ( u s u a l l y  
f i v e  pe rcen t  bu t  sometimes a s  much a s  twenty pe rcen t )  of  any c l a s s  of  e q u i t y  
s e c u r i t i e s .  491 The t y p i c a l  S t a t e  s t a t u t e  does no t  app ly  t o  " f r i e n d l y "  mergers  
o r  t a k e o v e r s ,  r e q u i r e s  n o t i c e  of  a  takeover  b id  p r i o r  t o  i t s  commencement, and 
r e q u i r e s  pro r a t a  purchases ,  which may d i f f e r  from t h e  amounts s e t  f o r t h  by t h e  
SEC. 501 There i s  a  s e r i o u s  l e g a l  ques t ion  whether t h e s e  S t a t e  s t a t u t e s  a r e  -
preempted by Fede ra l  law.  he February 1980 proposed amendments t o  t h e  W i l -  
l iams Act would have reso lved  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  by making e x p l i c i t  Fede ra l  preemp- 
t i o n  of S t a t e  takeover  laws.)  
481 Bowers, Thomas L. Tender O f f e r s :  A Guide f o r  t h e  1980s. Mergers 
and ~ q u i s i t i o n s ,  Summer 1981. p. 28. 
491 Ka tche r ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  4-91. -
501 Wander, op.  c i t . ,  p. 93-94. -
S t a t e  takeover  laws p l ay  a  r o l e  i n  t h e  merger p r o c e s s ,  a l t hough  r e c e n t l y  
most t ende r  o f f e r  c h a l l e n g e s  have taken  t h e  r o u t e  o f  s eek ing  a  Fede ra l  c o u r t  
i n j u n c t i o n .  But ,  s i n c e  t h e  wa i t i ng  pe r iods  between f i l i n g  and commencement 
of  an o f f e r  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  longer  a t  t h e  S t a t e  l e v e l ,  t h i s  may g i v e  t h e  s u b j e c t  
t ime ,  i f  no t  t o  avoid a  t akeove r ,  a t  l e a s t  t o  f i n d  a  "white kn igh t  ." Wander 
o f f e r s  t h e  fo l lowing  comnent on S t a t e  laws: "because t h e s e  laws tend  t o  f avo r  
management and work a g a i n s t  t h e  p a r t y  making t h e  t ende r  o f f e r ,  t h e y  p rov ide  
t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  management ." 51/  Bowers -
n o t e s  t h a t ,  "al though packaged a s  i n v e s t o r  p r o t e c t i o n  s t a t u t e s ,  many s t a t e  laws 
preempted t h e  sha reho lde r  p r o t e c t i o n  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Wil l iams Act." 52/ -
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Federa l  and S t a t e  c o u r t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  out-  
l i ned  i n  Chart 2 .  Fede ra l  c o u r t s  review d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  by t h e  SEC and have de- 
voted  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  d e f i n i n g  t ende r  o f f e r s .  They may e n j o i n  t h e  
a c t i v i t y  of  t ende r  o f f e r o r s  o r  s u b j e c t s  which have v i o l a t e d  Fede ra l  and S t a t e  
tender  o f f e r  s t a t u t e s .  Federa l  c o u r t s  a l s o  judge whether  S t a t e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  law 
i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  apply ing  t h e  Commerce Clause and t h e  Supremacy Clause  o f  t h e  
United S t a t e s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  concern  i s  whether t h e  S t a t e  laws 
o b s t r u c t  i n t e r s t a t e  commerce and whether  t h e y  c o n f l i c t  wi th  Fede ra l  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
law. Severa l  S t a t e  s t a t u t e s ,  i nc lud ing  those  o f  I l l i n o i s ,  New J e r s e y ,  and North 
C a r o l i n a ,  have been he ld  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  on one o r  bo th  o f  t h e s e  grounds .  531 -
5 2 /  Bowers, op.  c i t . ,  p. 28. -
531 Bowers, op. c i t . ,  p. 29. A c a s e  c u r r e n t l y  pending i n  t h e  Supreme 
~ o u r t 7 ~ i t e  Corp. v .  Dixon was dec ided  i n  t h e  7 t h  C i r c u i t  Court  o f  Appeals ,  
and t h e  Supreme Court noted j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  Edgar v .  Mite  Corp. on May 4,  1981) 
may de termine  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of  S t a t e  t akeove r  laws.  
Sources of 
Law Affecting 
Tender Offers Interprets federal and state tender offer 
laws 
Determines constitutionality of state 
tenaer offer law 
Determmes whether bidders or targets 
have vlolated state or federal tender of- 
fer law or anhtrust law 
Determines whether target directors 
have breached their fiduaary duty to 
protect shareholder interests 
Revlews SEC detemunatlons 
Enacts tender offer law (Wiharns Act) 
Enacts adrmnlstrative and regulatory 
statutes affecting tender offers 
Creates adnunistratwe and regulatory 
agencies to enforce above law 
-- 
Interprets state tender offer act 
Determines constitutionality of state 
tender offer act 
Determines whether bidders or targets 
have vlolated the state tender offer a a  
or other administrative or regulatory 
acts 
Determines whether target directors 
have breached their fiduciary duty to 
protect shareholder interests 
Revlews determinations made by the 
state securities commissioner 
Promulgates rules to supplemen! and 
enforce the Federal Tender Offer Ac! 
Receives federal tender offer filings 
Determines whether bidders or targets 
have vlolated the federal tender offer 
act 
Has authority to stop potentially anti- 
competitlve acquisitions 
Must approve acqulsitions of compu- 
rues in industries 11 regulates 
Must approve acquisitions o! compu- 
nies in industries it regulates 
Enacts tender offer law which endows Promulgates rules and regulatiqns to 
the state securities commissioner urlth supplement and enforce the state tender 
power to enforce the law offer act 
Enacts regulatory statutes affecting Receives all tender offer filings 
tender offers 
Determines whether bidders or targets 
Enacts genera: incorporation law in- have wolated the state act 
cluding director responsibilities 
Source: Mergers and Acquisitions, Vol. 16, Summer 1981. p .  30. 
S t a t e  c o u r t s  cons ide r  a  s e t  o f  i s s u e s  s i m i l i a r  t o  t h o s e  cons ide red  by 
Federa l  c o u r t s  : 
Like t h e  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s ,  which i n t e r p r e t  t h e  Wil l iams Act ,  c o u r t s  i n  
a  g iven  s t a t e  system i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  s t a t e ' s  t e n d e r  o f f e r  a c t  and 
de t e rmine  i t s  c o n s i t u t i o n a l i t y .  I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  r u l i n g s ,  
t h e y  de t e rmine  whether t ende r  o f f e r o r s  o r  t a r g e t s  have v i o l a t e d  
state t ende r  o f f e r  s t a t u t e s  o r  any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o r  r e g u l a t o r y  a c t s  
which t h e  s t a t u t e s  have y i e lded  .... t h e  s t a t e  c o u r t s  ( a l s o )  rev iew 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  made by t h e  s t a t e  s e c u r i t i e s  conrmissions . z/ 
An ext remely  impor tan t  ques t ion  i n  c o u r t  a c t i o n s  concern ing  proposed take-  
o v e r s  i s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  whether t a r g e t  company d i r e c t o r s  have f i d u c i a r y  
d u t i e s  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  company sha reho lde r s  and whether such d u t i e s ,  i f  any ,  have 
been breached .  Such f i d u c i a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  s u i t s  a r e  common, bu t  few a r e  suc- 
c e s s f u l ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o u r t s  a r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  second-guess t h e  b u s i n e s s  judgment o f  
t h e  t a r g e t ' s  d i r e c t o r s ,  u n l e s s  t hey  a c t  " eg reg ious ly  con t r a ry"  t o  t h e  share-  
h o l d e r s '  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s .  55/  (App l i ca t ion  of S t a t e  law t o  uphold t h e  b u s i n e s s  -
judgment of management t o  r e j e c t  a  takeover  b id  w i l l  be d i s cus sed  i n  t h e  De- 
f e n s i v e  T a c t i c s  S e c t i o n  below. ) 
C. Mergers and A c q u i s i t i o n s :  Fede ra l  Reserve Overs ight  
1. Marein Reauirements 
S e c t i o n  7 of t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  Exchange Act o f  1934 a u t h o r i z e s  t h e  Board o f  
Governors o f  t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve System ( t h e  Fed) t o  r e g u l a t e  margin  r e q u i r e -  
ment te rms  under which c r e d i t  can be extended when s e c u r i t i e s  a r e  used a s  co l -  
l a t e r a l  f o r  a l oan  i n  connect ion  wi th  f i nanc ing  an a c q u i s i t i o n .  56/  The Fed -
54/ Bowers, op. c i t . ,  p.  29. -
55/  Bowers, op. c i t . ,  p. 31. -
56/ For a  more comprehensive t r ea tmen t  of  t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  
of  ~ o s r e s s .  Congress iona l  Research Se rv i ce .  The Role of  Secured Bank Cred i t  
i n  Corpora te  A c q u i s i t i o n s .  Report No. 81-186 E ,  by Kevin F. Winch. Washington, 
1981. ( H e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  Winch, Secured Bank C r e d i t . )  
has issued a series of regulations which apply to tender offer loans including: 
(1) Regulation U - establishes margin requirements which restrict 
the amount of bank credit which may be used for the purpose of 
purchasing or carrying "margin securities," (defined to 
include, among other things, stock registered on a national 
securities exchange and over-the-counter securities) where 
securities are used as collateral stock. 
(2) Regulation T - prohibits broker-dealers from extending credit or 
arranging for credit extension in violation of the margin 
requirements established by the Fed. 
(3) Regulation G - governs margin rules for lending by persons other 
than broker-dealers and banks. 
(4) Regulation X - prohibits, among other things, the borrowing of money 
which is lent in violation of the Fed's margin rules and thus 
governs borrowers who obtain securities credit, as opposed to 
lenders, as in regulations U, T and G. 
Margin requirements have ranged from 25 to 100 percent but have been set 
at 50 percent since January 3, 1974. This means that banks and broker dealers 
may not extend or arrange credit for the purpose of purchasing securities in 
excess of 50 percent of the value of such securities. 
Margin provisions serve several functions: 
Historically, their primary function has been to protect the nation's 
economy by preventing the excessive use of credit resources for 
securities speculation, rather than for the purposes of commerce, 
industry and agriculture. Their secondary historical purpose has 
been to provide one means of preventing instability in the securities 
markets. Such instability can occur when margin requirements are 
inadequate, because securities held as collateral for margin 
loans must be sold when they decrease in value and when customers are 
unwilling or unable to provide additional collateral. Such forced 
sales can accelerate the decline of securities prices. Third, margin 
requirements provide a measure of investor protection by preventing 
the extension of credit beyond what is reasonable for investors to 
carry. 571 
The need for regulation of margin requirements in the area of corporate 
acquisitions may be regarded as similiar to that more traditionally applicable 
to the retail investor. Like individuals, corporate entities can also 
571 U.S. Congress. House. Uniform Margin Requirements. Report No. 
97-25x 97th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt . Print. Off, 1981. 
p. 2. 
overextend themselves, especially in an atmosphere where tender offers can 
create an inflated price for the stock of a target company. Rumors of takeover 
can promote sharp market fluctuations, which margin requirements may temper. 
But, perhaps most important, the corporate takeover can involve diversion of 
credit to the stock markets of far greater magnitude than the financing of 
individual speculation. 581 -
For any stock-secured bank loan, including the few used in tender offers, 
the Fed requires the filing of a statement of purpose of the loan; thus such 
loans are commonly referred to as "purpose credit" or "purpose loans." 591 -
While charges that an offeror failed to make adequate disclosure in connection 
with these loans may be used as a defensive tactic, this has rarely, if ever, 
been a successful defense. 
2 .  Credit Policies and Foreign Investors 
Substantial public attention has recently been focused on credit policies 
associated with acquisitions of U.S. corporations by foreign investors, es- 
pecially because a larger proportion of takeovers of domestic companies by for- 
eign companies involves bank financing than domestic takeovers by domestic c o w  
panies. 601 In this connection, the discrepancy between margin requirements 
applicable to U.S. persons and to foreign investors spurred congressional in- 
quiry in 1981 by the Subcommittee on Teleconnnunications, Consumer Protection, 
and Finance of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee. 
581 Lipton, Martin. Some Recent Innovations to Avoid the Margin Regulations. 
New YG~ University Law Review, Vol. 46, March 1971. p. 13. 
591 Winch, Secured Bank Credit, op. cit. p. 11. -
601 Winch, Secured Bank Credit, op. cit . p. 11-12. -
The Subcommittee found that foreign investors en joy an advantage over U. S. 
persons in the takeover process. U.S. persons, whether they receive margin 
credit from domestic or foreign sources, are subject to the Fed's margin re- 
quirements, but foreign purchasers of U.S. securities, using foreign credit 
sources, are not. H.R. 4145, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on 
December 16, 1981, amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide uni- 
form margin requirements in transactions involving the acquisition of certain 
U.S. corporations by non-United States persons where such acquisition is fi- 
nanced by non-United States lenders. A companion Senate bill, S. 1436, has 
been marked up in committee but has not, at this writing, been further acted 
upon. 
D. Mergers and Acquisitions: FTC and Justice Department Oversight 
1. The FTC and the Justice Department Will Scrutinize the Proposed 
Merger for Possible Antitrust Violations 
The initial antitrust law, the Sherman Act of 1890, prohibits existing 
firms from entering into a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade (Section 1) and makes it illegal to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire to monopolize trade (Section 2). But the primary antimerger 
statute is Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914, which is directed against any 
acquisition which may have an anticompetitive effect. Section 7, as amended by 
the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, makes it illegal to acquire the stock or the 
assets of any corporation where the effect of that acquisition may be substan- 
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce in any section of the country. The Clayton Act was further amended 
in 1980 to cover non-corporate acquisitions and to cover companies "affecting" 
but not necessarily "engaged in" interstate commerce. Two agencies, the Fed- 
eral Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice, have concurrent 
jurisdiction to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act and, under the Hart-Scott- 
Rodino Act, which added Section 7A to the Clayton Act, large mergers and acqui- 
sitions require filing with both the FTC and the Justice Department. - 61/ 
Antitrust attorney Ira Millstein describes the principal merger and acquisition 
antitrust issues as those concerning the definitions of the relevant product 
and geographic markets and whether the effect of the merger or acquisition may 
be substantially to lessen competition in those defined markets. - 62/ 
2. Merger Guidelines 
The Justice Department has issued guidelines and the FTC has issued 
rules 63/ to indicate their enforcement policies in the merger area. The Jus- - 
tice Department's 1968 merger guidelines set forth standards which the Depart- 
ment has employed in determining whether or not to challenge in the courts a 
merger or acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as more gen- 
eral expressions of its enforcement policy. The Guidelines are currently being 
revised so that, according to William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Anti- 
trust Division, they more accurately reflect market realities, The revised 
guidelines are expected to be available by spring of 1982 and, until such time 
61/ After a filing is made, an informal FTC and Justice Department liason 
commi'iTee meets to decide which agency will take jurisdiction over the transaction. 
Prior jurisdiction over a company or industry does not necessarily indicate 
whether it will be the FTC or Justice which will exercise jurisdiction in 
a new matter. 
62/ Prepared statement by Ira M. Millstein, CRS Merger Tactics and 
~ u b l i r ~ o l i c ~  Seminar, October 21, 1981. p. 3. 
63/ The FTC's rules are embodied in special industry guidelines issued 
in 19z-1968 (some of which have since been repealed), which are applicable 
to a limited number of industries: food distribution, cement, grocery products, 
manufacturing, textile mill products and dairy. von Kalinowski, op. cit., 
174-3. 
as they are available, participants in merger/takeover transactions have been 
advised to utilize the 1968 guidelines. 
Eut it should be emphasized that these guidelines are merely intended to 
acquaint interested parties with the policies and methods of the Department 
of Justice generally, and should not be solely relied on to predict the Depart- 
ment's response to a particular merger or acquisition. Millstein notes that 
factors not considered in the guidelines may lead the Department to challenge a 
merger which appears on its face to fall within the range of permitted mergers. 
Furthermore, compliance with the guidelines does not constitute a defense to a 
Department of Justice, FTC, or private challenge under Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. 64/ - 
The Guidelines focus principally on the structure of the market and are 
intended to identify those mergers that "alter market structure in ways likely 
now or eventually to encourage or permit non-competitive conduct." The concept 
of market structure is key, since, according to the Guidelines: 
the conduct of the individual firms in a market tends to be 
controlled by the structure of that market, e.g., by those market 
conditions which are fairly permanent or subject only to slow change 
(such as, principally the number of substantial firms selling in the 
market, the relative sizes of their respective market shares, and 
the substantiality of barriers to the entry of new firms into the 
market). 
The current guideline standards vary according to whether the proposed mer- 
ger is classified as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. They rely on four- 
firm-concentration-ratios (the sum of the market shares of the four largest 
firms in the industry) and on the market shares of the acquired and acquiring 
64/ For a detailed discussion of private Section 7 actions, see American 
Bar  goc cia ti on Section of Antitrust Law, "The Private Enforcement of Section 7 
of the Clayton Act, 1977.'' 
firms to evaluate the likely anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions. Certain exceptions exist for firms considered to be ''failing." 651 -
(1) Horizontal acquisitions. The Guidelines focus primarily on market 
structure criteria: 
a. In highly concentrated markets (the four largest firms occupy over 
75% of the market, as defined by an appropriate measure such as 
sales or shipments for a manufacturing company or deposits for a 
bank), a merger would ordinarily be challenged if it involved the 




15% or more 
Acquired Firm 
4% or more 
2% or more 
1 %  or more 
b. In less highly concentrated markets (the four largest firms 
occupy less than 75% of the market), a merger would ordinarily 
be challenged if it involved the following market shares: 
Acquiring Firm 




25% or more 
Acquired Firm 
5% or more 
4% or more 
3% or more 
2% or more 
1 %  or more 
c. In a market with a trend towards concentration (the aggregate 
market share of any grouping of the largest firns in the market 
from the two largest to the eight largest has increased by 
approximately 7 %  or more of the market over a specified and 
representative period of time), a merger would be challenged 
if any of the eight largest companies in the market wished to 
merge with any firm occupying 2% or more of the market. 
Acquiring Firm 
any of the eight 
largest 
Acquired Firm 
2% or more 
6 5 /  To fall within the perameters of the failing company doctrine and to 
make sprima facie case that a company is a "failing company," it must show, at 
least, that ( 1 )  it is facing business failure and its prospects of reorganiza- 
tion are dim or nonexistent, and that ( 2 )  it has no other reasonable alterna- 
tives less detrimental to competition; e.g., it must show that there are no 
other available purchasers with whom a merger would have had a less anticom- 
petitive effect. See U. S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 
A Legal Overview of the Antitrust Aspects of Mergers. Report No. 78-247 A, by 
Janice Rubin. Washington, 1978.  
d. In cases where there are no specific market share standards, a merger 
would ordinarily be challenged in the following circumstances: 
1. acquisition of a competitor which is a particularly 
"disturbing," "disruptive," or "otherwise unusually 
competitive factor" in the market; and 
2. merger involving a substantial firm and a firm which, 
despite an insubstantial market share, possesses 
an unusual competitive potential or has an asset such 
as a patent that confers an unusual competitive advantage. 
( 2 )  Vertical Acquisitions. 661 The Guidelines focus on three criteria: 
(a) the market share of the supplier firm; (b) the market share of the - - 
buyer firm; and (c) conditions of entry in the buyer firm's market. 
The types of vertical mergers likely to be challenged are those where 
a significant adverse competitive effect is considered probable in 
either of the two markets when measured by the following 
standards : 
a. Adverse effect in the market of the supplying partner is assumed where: 
1. the supplying partner to the merger accounts for approxi- 
mately 10% or more of the sales in its market, and 
2. a merging firm that purchases the products of 
the supplying partner accounts for approximately 
6% percent of the purchases in that market, unless it 
clearly appears that there are no significant barriers to 
entry into the business of the merging (i.e., purchasing) 
firm. 
b. Adverse effect in the market of the purchasing partner is assumed 
where : 
1. the supplying partner to the merger accounts for 
approximately 20% or more of the sales in its market, and 
2. a merging party uses what the other supplies and accounts 
for approximately 10% or more of the sales in the 
market in which it sells, and 
3. the product sold by the supplying partner and its 
competitors is either a complex one in which innovative 
changes have been made or is a scarce raw material, and 
4. the product sold by the supplying partner is a significant 
feature of the end-product manufactured by the consuming 
partner and its competitors. 
661 Vertical acquisitions such as those which occur when the firms are 
in a buyer-supplier position; forward vertical integration occurs when a 
firm purchases a buyer and backward vertical integration occurs when a 
firm purchases a supplier. 
c. Adverse effect is assumed in the following non-market share cases: 
1. if a customer or supplier is acquired by a major firm in 
an industry with a significant trend toward vertical 
integration, if such a combination would raise barriers 
to entry, and if it does not promise to cut the costs of 
product ion, or 
2 .  if a customer or a supplier is acquired for the purpose of 
barring competitors from the market or otherwise putting 
them at a disadvantage. 
(3) Conglomerate Acquisitions. The Guidelines vary according to the 
type of conglomerate acquisition. 
a. Mergers involving potential entrants (deemed to have the 
technological and financial resources and economic incentive 
to enter a market) will ordinarily be challenged if the 
proposed merger is one between one of the most likely entrants 
into the market and 
1. any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market; 
2 .  one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares 
of the two largest firms amount to approximately 50% or more; 
3. one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares 
of the eight largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, 
provided the merging firm's share of the market amounts to 
approximately 10% or more; or 
4. one of the eight largest firms in a market in which 
the shares of these firms amount to approximately 75% 
or more, provided the merging firm's share of the market 
is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or 
two likely entrants into the market, or the merging 
firm is a rapidly growing firm. 
b. The Guidelines state that mergers may be challenged on the 
grounds that they create a danger of reciprocal buying, 671 -
671  Mergers creating danger of reciprocal buying (favoring one's customers 
when &king purchases of a product which is sold by the customer) will ordi- 
narily be challenged if 15% or more of the total purchases in a market in which 
one of the merging firms sells is accounted for by firms which also make sub- 
stantial sales in markets where the other merging firm is both a substantial 
buyer and a more substantial buyer than all or most of the competitors of the 
selling firm. That the merger will result in economies is not considered to be 
a valid defense to an otherwise unlawful merger that creates the danger of re- 
ciprocal buying. 
t h a t  t h e y  e n t r e n c h  market  power o r  r a i s e  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y ,  681 
o r  t h a t  t h e y  a f f e c t  agg rega t e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  69/ A s  a  p r a c t z a l  
m a t t e r ,  however, M i l l s t e i n  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e s e  t G o r i e s  have r a r e l y ,  
i f  e v e r ,  been r e l i e d  upon t o  c h a l l e n g e  a  merger  o r  a c q i s i t i o n .  
( 4 )  J o i n t  Ventures.  Ne i the r  t h e  Department of  J u s t i c e  no r  t h e  FTC 
h a s  promulgated g u i d e l i n e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s .  The c o u r t s  
have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  j o i n t  c r e a t i o n  by two o r  more c o r p o r a t i o n s  
of  a  t h i r d  c o r p o r a t i o n  may evoke s e r i o u s  problems under  Sec t ion  7  
o f  t h e  Clayton  a c t  i n  e i t h e r  of t h e  fo l lowing  s i t u a t i o n s :  - 70/ 
a .  two of  t h e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e r s  would have e n t e r e d  t h e  market  a l o n e  
b u t  f o r  t h e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e ,  o r  one would have e n t e r e d  and ano the r  
was and would have remained a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o t e n t i a l  compe t i t o r ;  
t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  a n  o l igopo ly  such  t h a t  a  few companies occupy 
most o f  t h e  marke t ;  and t h e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e r s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  two 
o f  them a r e  i n d u s t r y  l e a d e r s  i n  o t h e r  marke ts ;  o r  
68/  Mergers t h a t  en t r ench  market power o r  r a i s e  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  w i l l  
o r d i n a r i l y  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d  where t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a n t i c o m p e t i t i v e  consequences 
e x i s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  where a n  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  a  l e a d i n g  f i r m  i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  con- 
c e n t r a t e d  o r  r a p i d l y  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  market  may s e r v e  t o  e n t r e n c h  o r  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
market  power of  t h a t  f i r m  o r  r a i s e  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  i n  t h a t  market .  Examples 
a r e  : 
1.  a  merger  which produces a  v e r y  l a r g e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  
a b s o l u t e  s i z e  between t h e  merged f i r m  and t h e  l a r g e s t  
remaining f i r m s  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  marke ts ;  
2.  a  merger o f  f i r m s  producing r e l a t e d  p roduc t s  which may 
induce  p u r c h a s e r s ,  concerned about  t h e  merged f  i n n ' s  p o s s i b l e  
u s e  o f  l e v e r a g e ,  t o  buy p roduc t s  of  t h e  merged f i r m  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h o s e  of  compe t i t o r s ;  and 
3. a  merger  which may enhance t h e  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  merged f i r m  
t o  i n c r e a s e  product  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
marke t .  
69/  Mergers t h a t  a f f e c t  agg rega t e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  I n  1969,  t h e  Department 
o f  ~ u z i c e  announced t h a t  i t  might  "very we l l "  o r  "would probably" b r i n g  a c t i o n s  
a g a i n s t  t h e s e  t y p e s  of  mergers ,  a l t hough  no s i g n i f i c a n t  c a s e  h a s  been brought  
under  t h e s e  g u i d e l i n e s .  The Gu ide l ines  a f f e c t :  
1. any  conglomerate merger among t h e  t o p  200 manufac tur ing  
f i r m s  o r  f i r m s  o f  comparable s i z e  i n  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and 
2. any  conglomerate merger by one o f  t h e  t o p  200 manufac tur ing  
f i r m s  o f  any  l e a d i n g  producer  i n  any concen t r a t ed  
i n d u s t r y .  
70/ von Kal inowski ,  op. c i t . ,  574.05 -
b. t h e  j o i n t  ven tu re r s  have t h e  power t o  t r a n s f e r  s u b s t a n t i a l  
market power t o  t h e  j o i n t  venture.  The j o i n t  v e n t u r e r s  may 
have such power i f  toge the r  they account f o r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
por t ion  of t h e  market o u t l e t  f o r  companies i n  t h e  business  of 
t h e  j o i n t  ven tu re ,  o r  i f  they c o n t r o l  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  supply of 
t h e  raw m a t e r i a l  needed by companies i n  t h e  bus iness  of t h e  
j o i n t  venture .  
3 .  Premerger N o t i f i c a t i o n  Is Required 
Under t h e  provis ions  of T i t l e  I1 of t h e  P t r u s t  Improvemen .t of 1976 
( t h e  Hart-Scott-Rodino Act) ,  c/ p a r t i e s ,  inc luding f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t s ,  involved 
i n  a  t r a n s a c t i o n  such a s  a  merger, a c q u i s i t i o n ,  o r  even a  j o i n t  ven tu re ,  must 
f i l e  a  premerger n o t i f i c a t i o n  form with  t h e  Federal  Trade Commission and t h e  
A n t i t r u s t  Divis ion of t h e  J u s t i c e  Department. Only t r a n s a c t i o n s  among companies 
of c e r t a i n  s i z e s  a r e  covered. (The b a s i c  c r i t e r i a  a r e  t h a t  one company must 
have $100 m i l l i o n  i n  t o t a l  a s s e t s  o r  annual n e t  s a l e s  and t h e  o t h e r  company must 
have $10 m i l l i o n  i n  t o t a l  a s s e t s  o r  annual n e t  s a l e s ,  and t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  must 
involve  $15 m i l l i o n  o r  more i n  s tock  o r  a s s e t s  o r  15% o r  more of t h e  outstand- 
ing  vo t ing  s tock. )  The f i l i n g s  before  t h e  FTC and J u s t i c e  a r e  intended t o  
e l i c i t  s p e c i f i c  information from t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
t r a n s a c t i o n ,  including t h e  purchase p r i c e ,  each company's source  of revenues,  
and o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  and marketing information.  
The timing f o r  review of t h e  a n t i t r u s t  impl ica t ions  of a  merger i s  i n  many 
c a s e s  c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e  d e a l ,  s i n c e  delay may g i v e  t h e  sub jec t  company inc reased  
oppor tuni ty  t o  f i n d  a "white knight." S u b s t a n t i a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  by t h e  FTC o r  t h e  
J u s t i c e  Department may r e s u l t  i n  a r b i t r a g e u r s  p u l l i n g  ou t  of t h e  d e a l ,  reducing 
71/ M i l l s t e i n  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  premerger n o t i f i c a t i o n  scheme i s  c rea ted  by 
t h e  h r t - ~ c o t t - ~ o d i n o  A n t i t r u s t  Improvements Act of 1976, amending Sect ion 
7  of t h e  Clayton Act by adding Sec t ion  7A, 15 U.S.C. §18A, and by t h e  FTC Rules 
and Regulations promulgated pursuant t o  Sect ion 7A(d) of t h e  Act and found i n  
16 CFR P a r t s  801, 802 and 803. 
the likelihood the offeror will attain the requisite number of tendered shares, 
thus causing the deal to collapse. This happened when the Justice Department 
announced in the summer of 1981 that it wanted more information about Mobil's 
proposed acquisition of Conoco. Also, early in 1982, the FTC blocked, at least 
temporarily, Mobil Oil's proposed acquisition of 15 to 25 percent of U.S. 
Steel's common stock, a purchase considered by many analysts to be an attempt 
to use U.S. Steel shares as a wedge to pry loose all or part of Marathon Oil's 
assets which are being purchased by U.S. Steel. (Mobil had lost its bid for 
Marathon in the courts on anritrust grounds.) 
Once the basic information concerning the transaction is submitted, the 
Government has thirty days to study a proposed merger transaction (fifteen days 
for a cash tender offer--see footnote 72) and the transaction cannot be closed 
during this time period. Millstein describes the procedure as it relates to a 
merger transaction : 
If the Government feels that the transaction does not raise significant 
antitrust problems, the thirty day waiting period will pass and the 
parties can consummate the transaction. On the other hand, if the Gov- 
ernment is suspicious that the transaction does raise antitrust problems, 
it will, within the thirty day period, request additional information 
from the parties. As a result of a request for additional information, 
the transaction cannot be consummated until twenty days after the date 
on which the parties fulfill the Government's request for additional 
information. Moreover, the parties can consummate the transaction only 
if the Government takes no successful steps in that second twenty day 
period to challenge the acquisition--such as by seeking a preliminary 
injunction. 
Thus, in effect, before most mergers or acquisitions can be trans- 
acted, the Government will have at least fifty days--the initial thirty 
day waiting period plus the twenty day waiting period after a request 
for additional information is fulfilled--to study the transaction. It 
is during this period that the Administration's enforcement policies 
come into play. z/ 
7 2 1  Millstein, op. cit., p. 4-5. The initial waiting period for a 
cash tender offer is 15 days; a request for additional information to the 
offeror extends the period for 10 days subsequent to compliance with the 
request. The offeree must comply with such a request in a "reasonable" 
period of time, but cannot extend the waiting period (and thereby delay the 
tender offer) by delaying its response to the request. 
Does t h e  Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  Propose t o  Change A n t i t r u s t  
Enforcement R e l a t i n g  t o  Mergers and A c q u i s i t i o n s ?  
Eecause o f  t h e  d e l i c a t e  t im ing  involved  i n  merger  and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y ,  
t h e  Government's a b i l i t y  t o  d e l a y  a  d e a l  can  have a  v i t a l l y  impor t an t  d e t e r r e n t  
e f f e c t  and can  a c t u a l l y  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a  more l e n g t h y  mon i to r ing  e f f o r t  involv-  
i n g  l i t i g a t i o n .  There i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  however, abou t  how v igo rous ly  
t h e  c u r r e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  mon i to r ing  a n t i t r u s t  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  g e n e r a l  and t h e  
a n t i t r u s t  a s p e c t s  of  merger  and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  The r e c e n t  
proposed s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  American Telephone & Telegraph  Company s u i t ,  t h e  d i s -  
m i s s a l  of  t h e  l e n g t h y  I E M  s u i t ,  and o t h e r  a c t i o n s  by t h e  c u r r e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
have prompted commentators t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e s e  developments  mark a  r a d i c a l  r e l axa -  
t i o n  o f  a n t i t r u s t  enforcement .  While comments about  how a n t i t r u s t  p o l i c y  i n  
g e n e r a l  i s  changing a r e  beyond t h e  scope o f  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  some b r i e f  comments on 
p o s s i b l e  changes i n  a n t i t r u s t  p o l i c y  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  mergers  a r e  r e l e v a n t .  
Some contend t h a t  t h e  FTC's and J u s t i c e  Department 's  c u r r e n t  enforcement  
a c t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  mergers  does  n o t  appea r  t o  be  a d rama t i c  d e p a r t u r e  from 
p a s t  p o l i c i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  s o  f a r .  z/ Thus, i n  1981, t h e  J u s t i c e  Department e f -  
f e c t i v e l y  blocked t h e  Mobil-Conoco merger by r e q u e s t i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  i n fo rma t ion  
about  t h e  d e a l ,  t h e  J u s t i c e  Department announced i t  would oppose on  a n t i t r u s t  
grounds a  merger  i n  t h e  bee r  i n d u s t r y  between J o s .  S c h l i t z  Prewing and G.  Heileman 
Erewing, and t h e  FTC announced i t  would a s k  t h e  c o u r t  t o  b a r  LTV from buying 
Grumman (LTV l a t e r  backed o u t  of t h e  d e a l ) .  I n  December 1981, t h e  FTC announced 
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  Mobil O i l ' s  t akeover  o f  Marathon O i l  and i n  J anua ry  1982 t h e  FTC 
de layed  H o b i l ' s  purchase  of  a  l a r g e  b lock  of U.S. S t e e l  s t o c k ,  presumably s i n c e  
Mobil was a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a c q u i r e  i n d i r e c t l y  some of Marathon O i l ' s  a s s e t s .  These 
a c t i o n s  do  i n d i c a t e  some c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  p r i o r  enforcement  t r e n d s .  
7 3 /  M i l l s t e i n ,  op.  c i t .  p .  5-7. -
On the other hand, the FTC has been criticized as giving the appearance 
of assisting in the Mobil-Marathon deal by detailing terms--Congressmen John 
Dingell and Albert Gore Jr. have charged that the FTC thus provided a "blue- 
printw--under which Mobil could sell certain downstream operations to Amerada 
Hess to avoid antitrust problems and gain approval. It is not unusual, how- 
ever, for parties to a merger to meet with FTC staff (or, for that matter, with 
Justice staff) and to arrive at informal agreements leading to a stipulation-- 
which could conceivably incorporate such actions as a hold separate order. But 
the FTCfs method of disclosing its terms, by unilaterally issuing terms of ap- 
proval, was unusual and did give the appearance of unprecedented assistance. 
The Wall Street Journal reported that Tyler Baker, special assistant to 
Antitrust Division chief William Baxter, briefed a conference of attorneys in 
November 1981 on proposed changes in the Justice Department's merger guidelines. 
Baker is quoted as saying: "There is a high degree of consistency in merger 
enforcement...there won't be a great deviation from the past at all, once the 
new guidelines are published." 741 Among the changes alluded to was the pos- 
sible replacement of indicators of market share. Existing guidelines define a 
market as varying more or less in concentration depending on how many companies 
command what portion of sales; various percentages of market share are then 
used to provide one indicator of permissible mergers. A measure called the 
Herfindahl index - 751 is expected to replace existing guidelines to determine 
74/ Lawyers See Planned Merger Guidelines of U.S. as Little Softened 
from the Past. Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1981. 
75/ The Herfindahl index was named for Orris C. Herfindahl's 1950 work on 
concezration in the U.S. steel industry. Apparently there is some dispute as 
to the author of the index since Albert 0. Hirschman claims to be the originator 
bv virtue of his havinn first computed the index for a large number of countries 
ii his 1945 book ~ational Power and the Structure of ~oreign Trade. (See 
Hirschman, Albert 0. The Paternity of an Index. American Economic Review. 
(continued) 
permissible mergers at varying levels of market concentration. Millstein 
argues that use of the index indicates the Administration still intends to scru- 
tinize market share numbers and the index method will not yield dramatically 
different results from use of the guidelines. 761 Furthermore, since Baxter 
(continued) October 1964, p. 761-2.) In any event, the so-called Herfindahl In- 
dex expresses market concentration as the sum of the squares of the market share 
percentage of each firm in the relevant industry. Thus, the index for an industry 
with four equal-size competitors is 2,500 (25'+ 25'+ 251+ 25L). If one of these 
firms were to control 70% of the market andleach of the other three only lo%, 
the index would be 5,200 (702+ loz+ lo2+ 10 ) . As the examples demonstrate, the 
Herfindahl index not only measures the extent of concentration within an indus- 
try, but also reflects the distribution of market share among the major firms of 
the industry. Since many economists believe that an industry which is both con- 
centrated and dominated by one or two very large firms is less competitive than 
one which is merely concentrated, the Herfindahl index is thought to be a su- 
perior indicator of market competitiveness than the four-firm-concentration- 
ratio more commonly employed. Thus, while in the two examples above the Her- 
findahl index ranges from 2,500 to 5,200, the four-firm-concentration-ratio 
test would not distinguish among them at all, since in each instance the four- 
firm-concentration-ratio is 100%. 
According to the Justice Department, mergers or acquisitions in an indus- 
try with a Herfindahl index of more than 1,600 would very likely be challenged, 
if the merger or acquisition raised the index by 50 to 75 points. Mergers that 
raised the index by at least 100 points would typically be challenged, where 
the industry's index was between 1,000 and 1,600. And mergers in industries 
with an index of below 1,000 would usually not be challenged. A change in the 
Herfindahl index is equal to twice the product of the market shares of the 
firms involved. For example, if one firm with a market share of 10% proposed 
to acquire another firm with market share of 5%, this would raise the index by 
100 points, and the acquisition would typically be challenged. (Discussion of 
Herfindahl index excerpted from a January 25, 1982, memorandum sent by Ira M. 
Mills tein to CRS. ) 
761 According to calculations made by Millstein, the proposed Herfindahl 
indexstandards are more lax for industries with several large competitors. 
But in industries dominated by one or two large firms but with relatively low 
four-firm-concentration-ratios, the proposed standards are actually stricter. 
For example, in an industry with firms having market shares of 40%, lo%, and 
3%, and numerous smaller firms, a merger between the firms with 10% and 3% 
market shares would not be subject to challenge under the existing standards 
but would be under the proposed standards. Even where the proposed guidelines 
are less strict, the change from the existing standards is moderate. For 
example, in an industry with a four-firm-concentration-ratio of between 50% 
and 75%, under the existing standards a firm with a market share of 10% may 
acquire a firm with a market share of less than 4%. Under the proposed Her- 
findahl index standard, it could acquire a firm with a market share of less 
than 5%. (January 25, 1982, memorandum, op. cit.) 
has indicated he will not permit a failing company defense, he may be tougher 
than his predecessors on this issue. In the area of conglomerate mergers, 
where numerical guidelines are not established, Eaxter has stated that, in 
general, he does not believe conglomerate mergers pose an antitrust problem. 
Millstein notes that while prior administrations had from time to time chal- 
lenged conglomerate mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Pct, the Government 
has recently lost lost virtually every case, and the Supreme Court has seri- 
ously circumscribed the potential competition theories that underlie these 
cases. Thus, it is argued, no dramatic change in enforcement in the merger 
area has thus far occurred. z/ 
On the other hand, public statements made by Administration officials have 
not inspired confidence in a strict enforcement policy. For example, press ac- 
counts report statements by Antitrust Chief Eaxter (he doesn't believe that 
"conglomerate mergers, or mergers generally, have increased economic concentra- 
tion to dangerous levels"), Attorney General William French Smith (the Govern- 
ment "must recognize that bigness in business does not necessarily mean bad- 
ness"), and FTC Chairman James Miller (the Commission's past enforcement of 
antitrust laws barring price discrimination were "misdirected" and he has, 
"strong reservations" about certain long-standing FTC requirements and about 
the role of the FTC itself). - 781 Thus far, however, the only significant evi- 
dence of relaxation of merger policy has been the FTC's issuance of the "blue- 
print" for the Mobil-Marathon merger. Most other major merger policies to 
77/ Millstein, Prepared Statement, op. cit., p. 9. -
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Antitrust 
See Antitrust: More Boom Than Bust. Washington Post, August 23, 
FTC Chief Miller Questions Agency Role in Consumer Protection, 
Areas. Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1981. See also Big Shift 
in Antitrust Policy. Dun's Review, Vol. 118, August 1981. p. 38-40; and Eaxter 
at Antitrust: Can the Professor Succeed on Erains Alone? American Lawyer, 
Vol. 3, July 1981. p. 25, 28-31. 
date support the Millstein thesis that formal enforcement in this area is not 
changing very much. 
Finally, the courts, the ultimate forum for resolving questions concerning 
the antitrust implications of proposed mergers, seem to be supporting a reason- 
ably strict interpretation of antitrust laws, as illustrated by the recent 
series of rulings on Mobil's attempt to take over Marathon Oil. Thus, on Novem- 
ber 30, 1981, Federal Judge John Manos in Cleveland issued a preliminary injunc- 
tion barring Mobil's acquisition of Marathon, holding there was a substantial 
likelihood that Mobil's proposed takeover would be found to violate antitrust 
law, especially because of overlaps in gasoline marketing and refining in the 
Midwest (Marathon Oil Company v. Mobil Corp., No. 81-2193). The injunction was 
upheld on December 23rd by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
(Nos. 81-3704, 81-3713). Finally, early in January 1982, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court denied Mobil's emergency application to enjoin 
U.S. Steel's takeover of Marathon pending an appeal to the full court of the 
Sixth Circuit's ruling that Mobil could not acquire Marathon. Mobil had based 
its appeal partially on the ground that Judge Manos had refused to reconsider 
his original ruling in light of Mobil's subsequent proposal to sell Marathon's 
U.S. marketing and refining assets to Amerada Hess. 

111. THE TAKEOVER PROCESS: DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
A .  The R e s ~ o n s i b i l i t i e s  of Management 
Management of a  company which i s  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  a  h o s t i l e  takeover  a t t e m p t ,  
o r  which b e l i e v e s  i t s e l f  t o  be  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  such an a t t a c k ,  may engage i n  ce r -  
t a i n  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  t o  thwar t  what i t  c o n s i d e r s  t o  be  an u n d e s i r a b l e  " r a id . "  
I n  a  wide v a r i e t y  o f  i n s t a n c e s ,  management may e v a l u a t e  t h e  b id  and r e j e c t  i t  
under what has  come t o  b e  known a s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  judgment r u l e .  For example, 
i n  Pan te r  v .  Marsha l l  F i e l d  & Co. (dec ided  i n  1980) ,  s t ockho lde r  a c t i o n s  
were b rough t ,  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  board of d i r e c t o r ' s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a  takeover  proposa l  
and t h e  d e f e n s i v e  measures (which inc luded  a  l a w s u i t  and an a c q u i s i t i o n  program) 
taken  by t h e  board t o  f o r e c l o s e  t h e  t akove r .  The c o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  bus ines s  
judgment r u l e  governs t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  a  takeover  b id  by t h e  board o f  d i -  
r e c t o r s  of a  t a r g e t ;  where t h e  d i r e c t o r s  reach  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  a f t e r  f u l l  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  of a l l  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  p roposa l  and a f t e r  r e c e i v i n g  
a n t i t r u s t  and s e c u r i t i e s  law adv ice  from o u t s i d e  c o u n s e l ,  t h e y  cannot  be  he ld  
t o  have breached t h e i r  f i d u c i a r y  d u t i e s .  791 -
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a  board may r e j e c t  a  b id  not  on t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h a t  b i d ,  
bu t  r a t h e r  t o  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  company and t o  keep management i n  o f f i c e .  
Cour ts  have he ld  t h a t ,  under t h e  p r i m a r y ,  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  a r e  
improper i f  t hey  a r e  f o r  t h e  primary purpose o f  keeping management i n  o f f i c e .  
In  a d d i t i o n ,  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  t a c t i c s  used by management du r ing  t h e  takeover  pro- 
c e s s  may be cha l l enged  i n  t h e  c o u r t s .  For  example, i n  a  r u l i n g  i n  January  1982 
a g a i n s t  U.S. S t e e l ,  t h e  U.S. Court of Appeals f o r  t h e  S i x t h  C i r c u i t  i n  Cincin- 
n a t i  he ld  i l l e g a l  c e r t a i n  agreements designed t o  " lock up" t h e  f r i e n d l y  merger 
791 L i p t o n ,  Mar t in .  Takeover Bids i n  t h e  T a r g e t ' s  Boardroom; an Update 
~ f t e r a n e  Year. Bus iness  Lawyer, v .  36, 1981. p. 1018. 
between U.S. S t e e l  and Marathon. The agreements  gave U.S. S t e e l  two o p t i o n s  
("poisoned w e l l  op t ions" )  from Marathon: one g ran t ed  U.S. S t e e l  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
buy Marathon's  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  Yates o i l  f i e l d  i n  Texas f o r  2.8 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  whether U.S. S t e e l  won Marathon; t h e  o t h e r  g ran t ed  U.S. S t e e l  t h e  
r i g h t  t o  buy 10 m i l l i o n  new Marathon compon s h a r e s ,  about 17 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  o u t s t a n d i n g  f o r  90 d o l l a r s  a  s h a r e .  
The c o u r t  might have ques t ioned  whether t h e  g r a n t i n g  of  such o p t i o n s  
breached t h e  f i d u c i a r y  d u t y  of Marathon d i r e c t o r s  t o  t h e i r  sha reho lde r s  but  
r e f r a i n e d  from doing so .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  c o u r t  a t t a c k e d  t h e  agreements  on t h e  
grounds t h a t  t hey  c o n s t i t u t e d  "manipula t ive"  behavior  under t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  laws. 
The c o u r t  reasoned t h a t ,  by r ende r ing  t h e  Yates f i e l d s  u n a v a i l a b l e  t o  o t h e r  
companies and i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  number of s h a r e s  o t h e r  companies would have t o  
o b t a i n  t o  g e t  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  agreements e f f e c t i v e l y  c r e a t e d  an a r t i f i c a l  c e i l i n g  
on t h e  p r i c e  of  Marathon s h a r e s ,  t h e  125 d o l l a r  per  s h a r e  p r i c e  t h a t  U.S. S t e e l  
o f f e r e d  p u b l i c  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  The "poisoned we l l  o p t i o n s  ," accord ing  t o  t h e  
c o u r t ,  no t  o n l y  a r t i f i c i a l l y  a f f e c t ,  bu t  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes comple te ly  
b lock ,  c o m p e t i t i v e  b idd ing  f o r  Marathon sha re s .  - 801 
While commentators view t h e  c o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  a s  a  s e tback  f o r  c e r t a i n  bid-  
d ing  t a c t i c s ,  t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  wi th  which o f f e n s i v e  and d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  have 
r e c e n t l y  evolved i n  t h e  dynamic merger p roces s  almost c e r t a i n l y  i n s u r e s  t h a t  
i f  t h e s e  l ock  up agreements a r e  no longer  u s e f u l ,  some o t h e r  t a c t i c  w i l l  r e -  
p l a c e  them and t h e  c o u r t s  w i l l  have t o  r u l e  on how t h e  d e f e n s e ' s  new v a r i a t i o n  
meshes w i th  t h e  f i d u c i a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  management i n  e v a l u a t i n g  takeover  
b i d s .  
80/ Court Rul ings  on U . S .  S t e e l  and Mobil May Change Merger Game, Slow 
O i l  ~ x e o v e r s ,  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  January  7 ,  1982. 
E v a l u a t i n g  a  Takeover Bid 
When a  company makes an u n s o l i c i t e d  
me r e s t r i c t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  SEC, FTC a 
t ende r  o f f e r  f o r  a n o t h e r ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  
~nd  J u s t  i c e  Department merger  o v e r s i g h t  
d e t a i l e d  above,  t h e  a c t i o n  can t ake  p l a c e  r ap id ly -much  more r a p i d l y  t han  f o r  a  
n e g o i t a t e d  a c q u i s i t i o n .  The s u b j e c t ' s  board o f  d i r e c t o r s  may have l i t t l e  time 
t o  s t u d y  t h e  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  d e a l ;  i ndeed ,  t h a t  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  o f f e n s i v e  
s t r a t e g y .  Also ,  a  c e r t a i n  momentum may be b u i l t  up because ,  once a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
i s  announced, s h a r e h o l d e r s  may f e e l  compelled t o  t ende r  t h e i r  s h a r e s ,  o r  e l s e  
f a c e  t h e  p rospec t  o f  becoming m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  i n  a  company c o n t r o l l e d  by 
t h e  o f f e ro r - - i n  t h i s  event  they  may be  " f rozen  out"  and loge  bo th  l i q u i d i t y  and 
v a l u e .  
A s u b j e c t  company may view t h e  d e a l  from a  v a r i e t y  o f  p e r s p e c t i v e s  and i t  
may seek  t o  r e s o l v e  a t  l e a s t  t h e  fo l lowing  q u e s t i o n s :  
- What w i l l  c o n t r o l  by ano the r  company mean t o  management? W i l l  
t h e y  l o s e  t h e i r  j obs?  
- Is  t h e  o f f e r i n g  p r i c e  f a i r ?  I s  t h e r e  ano the r  company--a "white  
knight1'--which would o f f e r  more o r  be  a  more compatable 
match i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s ?  
- What i s  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  o f f e r o r ' s  s e c u r i t i e s  i f  an exchange 
i s  involved?  Are a l l  sha reho lde r s  provided f o r  e q u a l l y  
by t h e  te rms  of  t h e  o f f e r ?  
- Is t h e  t iming  r i g h t  o r  would c o n d i t i o n s  be  more f a v o r a b l e  
t o  v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  such a s  management and 
s h a r e h o l d e r s  a t  another  t ime? 
- What w i l l  a  change i n  c o n t r o l  mean t o  employees, s u p p l i e r s ,  
cus tomers ,  and o t h e r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  of  t h e  company such a s  
t h e  community i n  which t h e  s u b j e c t  company i s  l o c a t e d ?  
- What i s  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  d e a l  w i l l  not  be  consumated? 
Are t h e r e  p o t e n t i a l  a n t i t r u s t  problems? Are o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  
app rova l s  r e q u i r e d ?  Has t h e  o f  f e r o r  f a i l e d  t o  make 
m a t e r i a l  d i s c l o s u r e s ?  
C. S t r u c t u r i n g  a  Defense i n  Advance of  a  Takeover 
The Na t iona l  A s s o c i a t i o n  of  Accountants  conducted a  su rvey ,  pub l i shed  i n  
t h e  s p r i n g  of  1980, o f  c o r p o r a t e  de fense  s t r a t e g i e s  among 177 o f  t h e  1,000 
l a r g e s t  i n d u s t r i a l  companies. The survey  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  40 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  com- 
pan i e s  c o n s i d e r  themselves  t o  be  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a  t akeove r .  The p r i n c i p a l  r ea -  
son  they  gave  f o r  t h e i r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  low p r i ce - ea rn ings  r a t i o  of  t h e i r  
s t o c k ;  o t h e r  major  f a c t o r s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  v u l n e r a b i l -  
i t y  a r e  underva lued  o r  h idden  a s s e t s ,  a  book v a l u e  h i g h e r  t han  t h e  market  p r i c e  
of  t h e i r  s t o c k ,  h igh  borrowing c a p a c i t y ,  and above average  r e t u r n  on n e t  
wor th .  811 The q u e s t i o n n a i r e  used i n  t h i s  survey  p r o v i d e s  i n s i g h t  i n t o  some of -
/ 
t h e  major  t y p e s  o f  d e f e n s e  s t r a t e g i e s .  
1. Elements  i n  t h e  O v e r a l l  S t r a t e g y  
These p r i m a r i l y  i nvo lve  amassing a  team of de fense  e x p e r t s  and making 
some changes  i n  t h e  company's image and d e a l i n g s  w i th  i t s  employees, i t s  major  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  and t h e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e .  According t o  t h e  su rvey ,  a c t i o n s  
might i n c l u d e :  82/  -
- e s t a b l i s h i n g  a permanent in-house de fense  commit t e e  
- a r r ang ing  f o r  a  s p e c i a l i z e d  law f i rm  on s tandby r e t a i n e r  
( i n d e e d ,  h i r i n g  on r e t a i n e r  from among t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
few t o p  l e g a l  s p e c i a l i s t s  would mean t h i s  l e g a l  
t a l e n t  won't  be used a g a i n s t  t h e  company) 
- a r r ang ing  f o r  a  proxy s o l i c i t a t i o n  f i r m  on s tandby r e t a i n e r  
( should  management wish t o  wage a  proxy b a t t l e  f o r  i t s  
own s h a r e s  t o  prevent  too  many s h a r e s  from f a l l i n g  i n t o  
t h e  hands of  t h e  o f f e r o r )  
81 /  Takeovers :  A Survey of Corpora te  Defense S t r a t e g i e s ,  Mergers 
and ~ G u i s i t i o n s ,  Spr ing  1980, p. 21. 
821 The fo l l owing  a c t i o n s  (bu t  no t  t h e  p a r e n t h e t i c a l  commentary 
on t h G e  a c t i o n s )  a r e  excerp ted  from t h e  Na t iona l  A s s o c i a t i o n  of  Accountants  
Survey,  i b i d .  
-arranging with an investment banker to be available for 
emergency action (an investment banker can assist in 
evaluating the deal, or in finding a "white knight") 
-maintaining a list of all larger stockholders to be contacted 
by telephone immediately after a tender offer (to assist 
management in keeping a substantial portion of the stock 
from being tendered or from being sold to arbitrageurs 
who would undoubtedly tender) 
-preparing in advance statements asking shareholders not to act 
until management has had time to evaluate the offer 
-preparing in advance a text stating why the company would be more 
successful operating independently rather than as a unit of a 
larger corporation 
-arranging with an outside public relations consultant to 
be available for emergency action (public relations 
specialists can be invaluable in stirring up public 
reaction against a takeover, including possible legislative 
action to block the takeover) 
-arranging for a variety of schedules for placing advertisements 
in the media and establishing a media list for distribution of 
news releases 
-establishing or intensifying an investor relations program to 
strengthen loyalty of existing stockholders and gain additional 
support for its stock 
-establishing or intensifying employees' stock purchase plan to 
create more support for the company and to create more insider 
holdings 
-establishing a system for tracking stock transfer records to detect 
any suspect new share ownership which might signal an attack. 
2. Shark-Repellent Tactics and Porcupine Amendments 
These can involve a series of changes in the company's capitalization 
or changes in charter and bylaw provisions to make a takeover attempt more 
difficult. Briefly they may include: =/ 
83/ See National Association of Accountants Survey, op. cit.; and Lipton, 
~ a r t i z  Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, The Business Lawyer, v. 35, 
November 197 9. 
changes i n  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  
- a r r ang ing  f o r  placement o f  common s t o c k  i n  f r i e n d l y  hands 
-making new o f f e r i n g s  o f  c o n v e r t i b l e  o r  o t h e r  e q u i t y  i s s u e s  
t h a t  d i s p e r s e  v o t i n g  power o r  p l a c e  more v o t i n g  power i n  
f r i e n d l y  hands 
-buying t h e  company's own s t o c k  on t h e  open market  t o  reduce  
p u b l i c  ownersh ip  
-changing d iv idend  p o l i c y  t o  encourage sha reho lde r  l o y a l t y  
- i n s t i t u t i n g  a  d iv idend  re ipves tment  p l an .  
b.  c h a r t e r  amendments 
- i n c o r p o r a t i n g  i n  ano the r  s t a t e  where t h e  takeover  laws a r e  
more s t r i n g e n t  
- r eo rgan i z ing  t he  e l e c t i o n  o r  compos i t ion  o f  t h e  board of 
d i r e c t o r s  ( t h i s  might  i nvo lve  amendments t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
number of  board members and s t a g g e r  t h e i r  t e rms  i n  o r d e r  
t o  d i l u t e  t h e  v o t e  o f  a  new member of  t h e  board p laced  
t h e r e  by t h e  o f f e r o r  which has  purchased a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
b lock  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  company's s t o c k )  
- r eo rgan i z ing  t h e  company's v o t i n g  procedures  (which might 
i n c l u d e  r e q u i r i n g  more t h a n  a  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  by t h e  
board o r  by s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  approve any b u s i n e s s  combina t ion)  
- i n s t i t u t i n g  compensation p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  who do 
not  t e n d e r  t h e i r  s t o c k  t o  a  r a i d e r  ( a  company's board 
might  v o t e  an amendment g i v i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r s  who do not  
t e n d e r  s h a r e s  du r ing  an o f f e r  t h e  r i g h t  t o  submit them f o r  
redemption a t  t h e  o f f e r  p r i c e  o r  t h e  h i g h e s t  market  p r i c e  
d u r i n g  t h e  prev ious  18 months) 
-implementing r e t i r e m e n t  and severence  pay terms f o r  management 
o r  o t h e r  employment compensat ion te rms  which might d i s cou rage  
a  takeover  
-dev i s ing  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  board of d i r e c t o r s  h a s  a  company 
p o l i c y  no t  t o  engage i n  merger  d i s c u s s i o n s  o r  t h a t  t h e  
board i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  cons ide r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  employees, 
cu s tomer s ,  s u p p l i e r s  and o t h e r s  when c o n s i d e r i n g  a  merger 
o r  t akeover  bid ( t h e s e  may have o n l y  minimal e f f e c t ,  but  
may be u s e f u l  when t h e  c o u r t s  app ly  t h e  b u s i n e s s  judgment 
r u l e  t o  t h e  b o a r d ' s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  b i d ) .  
D. S t r u c t u r i n g  a  Defense Once t h e  Tender O f f e r  h a s  been Made 
Assuming a  board of d i r e c t o r s  i s  faced wi th  a  h o s t i l e  u n s o l i c i t e d  t ende r  
o f f e r ,  i t  may engage i n  a  n m b e r  o f  a c t i o n s  t o  fend o f f  t h e  a t t a c k .  S t a t e  
c o u r t s  have been q u i t e  l i b e r a l  i n  approving d e f e n s i v e  a c t i o n s  under t he  bus- 
i n e s s  judgment r u l e ,  u n l e s s  i t  can be shown t h a t  t h e  primary purpose f o r  t h e  
d e f e n s i v e  a c t i o n  is  t o  keep management i n  power. The l a t t e r  is  g e n e r a l l y  d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  prove ,  s i n c e  c o u r t s  have he ld  t h a t  t h e  premium p r i c e  a lone  does  not  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  s o l e  de t e rmina t ion  o f  whether t h e  b id  should be accepted and 
t h e  s u b j e c t  company w i l l  have a  b a t t e r y  of  investment  a d v i s o r s ,  e x p e r t s  t o  
e v a l u a t e  i t s  wor th ,  and perhaps even a  committee o f  independent  d i r e c t o r s  who 
w i l l  t e s t i f y  about t h e  shortcomings o f  t h e  d e a l .  The c o u r t s  g e n e r a l l y  have 
been ext remely  r e l u c t a n t  t o  second-guess t h e  "bus iness  judgment" sense  o f  man- 
age r s  who run l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  The r e c e n t  r u l i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  U.S. S t e e l  
11 lock-up agreements" may cause merger s t r a t e g i s t s  t o  r e t h i n k  t h e i r  t a c t i c s ,  
bu t  it i s  not  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  r u l i n g  w i l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v e r s e  a  widespread 
t rend  of employing complex de fens ive  a c t i o n s .  The fo l lowing a c t i o n s  provide  a  
s ense  of  t h e  range  of poss ib i l i t i e s - and  t h e r e  i n e v i t a b l y  w i l l  be more v a r i a -  
t i o n s  a s  s i t u a t i o n s  change. A s u b j e c t  company may t r y  t o  defend i t s e l f  by: 
- f i nd ing  a  "white knight"  t o  buy it  on terms more f a v o r a b l e  
e i t h e r  with r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  premium o r  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  
management arrangements such a s  an agreement t o  a l low t h e  
t h e  company t o  o p e r a t e  autonomous 1 y  and wi th  c u r r e n t  management 
- acqu i r ing  ano the r  company which would c r e a t e  an a n t i t r u s t  
o r  r e g u l a t o r y  problem f o r  t h e  o f f e r o r  
-making a  " s t a n d s t i l l  agreement" w i t h  a  "big b ro the r "  who buys 
a  s u b s t a n t i a l  block of  t h e  s u b j e c t  company's s t o c k  t o  
make it ha rde r  f o r  t h e  o f f e r o r  t o  g a i n  a  m a j o r i t y  
of  t h e  s h a r e s  i n  t h e  t ende r  o f f e r  
-purchasing a t  a  premium sha res  t h e  o f f e r o r  has  acqui red  p r i o r  t o  
making t h e  t ende r  o f f e r  
-purchasing a t  t h e  going market p r i c e  t h e  company's own shares  
i n  t h e  market t o  t i e  up enough sha res  t o  reduce t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r o r  w i l l  ga in  c o n t r o l  (because of the  
premium g e n e r a l l y  o f f e r e d ,  t h e  s tock  would, however, be a t  
a  p r i c e  h igher  than before  t h e  tender  o f f e r  was announced, 
and i f  t h e  o f f e r o r  i s  de fea ted ,  t h e  s tock  may s i n k  t o  t h e  
pre-tender o f f e r  l e v e l )  
- i n s t i t u t i n g  a  s u i t  a g a i n s t  t h e  o f f e r o r  on t h e  grounds t h a t  
adequate d i s c l o s u r e  was no t  made under t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  laws. 
-enter ing i n t o  long-term employment c o n t r a c t s  wi th  e x i s t i n g  
management t o  make t h e  t a r g e t  company l e s s  d e s i r a b l e  
- s e l l i n g  key a s s e t s  o r  d i v i s i o n s  perceived t o  be those  a s p e c t s  
of t h e  t a r g e t  company most wanted by t h e  o f f e r o r .  
Merger t a c t i c s  a r e  c l e a r l y  innovat ive  and s t i l l  evolving. An i n t e r e s t i n g  
new defens ive  tac t ic- - the  ' ' royal ty  trust1'--is apparent ly  under cons ide ra t ion  by 
some o i l  companies worried about Marathon O i l ' s  kind of v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  takeover.  
Although t a x  ques t ions  concerning t h i s  t a c t i c  a r e  a s  y e t  unresolved,  841 the  
method invo lves  spinning o f f  d i r e c t l y  t o  shareholders  a  company's o i l  and gas  
rese rves .  The shareholders  become d i r e c t  owners of  t h e  o i l  flows and they re-  
c e i v e  monthly d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of t h e  production p r o f i t s .  A t  t h e  same t ime, t h e  
company s h r i n k s  i t s  rese rve  base ,  l e s sen ing  t h e  r i s k  of takeover.  New discov- 
e r i e s  then  have g r e a t e r  impact and some a n a l y s t s  c la im t h a t  t h e  combined e f f e c t  
of t h e  va lue  of t h e  common s t o c k  and t h e  r o y a l t y  t r u s t  can be an  improvement 
over t h e  common s t o c k  alone.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, management may r e j e c t  t h e  idea  
on t h e  grounds t h a t  spinning o f f  r e se rves  would d e p l e t e  cash f low and reduce 
t h e  company's a b i l i t y  t o  develop proper t i e s .  Eut f o r  a  company whose rese rves  
841 The Wall S t r e e t  Journal  r e p o r t s  t h a t  t h e  uncer ta in  t a x  s t a t u s  
of t h e r o y a l t y  t r u s t  has  made companies wary. Mesa, Southland, and Houston 
O i l  a l l  s e t  up t r u s t s  between l a t e  1979 and the  end of 1980, and have 
been wa i t ing  f o r  a  d e f i n i t i v e  r u l i n g  from t h e  I n t e r n a l  Revenue Service 
on whether t h e  t r u s t s '  monthly d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t a x a t i o n  
on ly  on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l ,  o r  whether, l i k e  d ividends ,  they w i l l  be taxed 
on both  t h e  corpora te  and ind iv idua l  l e v e l s .  See Thurow, Roger. Royalty 
Trus t s  Seen a s  Poss ible  Defense f o r  O i l  Firms Worried About Takeovers. Wall 
S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  November 24, 1981. 
a r e  g e n e r a t i n g  mure cash  than  can be used i n  c u r r e n t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  some a n a l y s t s  
contend t h e  r o y a l t y  t r u s t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  r i s k i n g  a t akeove r  o r  spending t h a t  
cash  on inves tments  o u t s i d e  t h e  energy  f i e l d .  The e v o l u t i o n a r y  p roces s  o f  mer- 
ge r  t a c t i c s  t h u s  proceeds ,  a l t hough  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  t r u s t ,  from whence a n t i -  
t r u s t  p o l i c y  emanated, does appear  t o  be  an i r o n i c  development. 

I V .  THE BOTTOM LINE: WHOSE INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE? 
Those making pub l i c  p o l i c y  concern ing  mergers  and a c q u i s i t i o n s  must con- 
tend  wi th  a  v a r i e t y  o f  competing i n t e r e s t s  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by: 
- management which may wish t o  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  company 
e i t h e r  t o  e x e r c i s e  prudent  b u s i n e s s  judgment o r  mere ly  
t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  j obs ;  
- s h a r e h o l d e r s  who may want t o  t ende r  t h e i r  s h a r e s  a t  t h e  h i g h e r  
premium p r i c e  an o f f e r o r  w i l l  b i d ;  
- s h a r e h o l d e r s  who a r e  " f rozen  out"  by v i r t u e  o f  no t  t e n d e r i n g  
o r  by v i r t u e  o f  a  l i m i t e d  t ende r  o f f e r  f o r  o n l y  a  p o r t i o n  of  
t h e  s h a r e s  who f i n d  themselves wi th  a  m i n o r i t y  i n t e r e s t ,  l e s s  
t han  f a i r  v a l u e ,  and l i t t l e  l i q u i d i t y  f o r  t h e i r  s h a r e s ;  
- employees who may view a  change of  management a s  e i t h e r  a  
p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e  development ( f r e q u e n t l y  employees w i l l  
oppose a  takeover  i f  t hey  b e l i e v e  a  more d i s t a n t  c e n t r a l  cor-  
p o r a t e  headqua r t e r s  w i l l  b e  l e s s  r e spons ive  t o  t h e i r  n e e d s ) ;  
- t h e  community i n  which t h e  company under t h r e a t  of  t akeove r  i s  
l o c a t e d  which may f e a r  p l a n t  c l o s i n g s  and r e l a t e d  l o s s  o f  income 
t o  t h e  l o c a l  economy; and 
- t h e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e  which might  be a f f e c t e d  by: 
( a )  p o s s i b l e  changes i n  t h e  economics of producing goods and 
s e r v i c e s - i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  en t renched  management 
i s  l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  than  t h e  new management would be and 
t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  w i l l  produce p roduc t ion  economies ; o r  
( b )  p o s s i b l e  changes i n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of  c o r p o r a t e  power 
which may have long-run n e g a t i v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  compe- 
t i t i o n  and t h e  p r i c e  and 
v i c e s  i n  t h e  economy. 
At torney  Mar t in  L i p t o n ,  who has  deve 
f i r m s ,  a rgues  t h a t  management has a  r i g h t  
i t s  proper  i n t e r e s t  and t h a t  avoidance of  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  goods and se r -  
oped de fense  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  numerous 
t o  oppose a  t akeove r  i t  deems not  i n  
t akeove r  a t t e m p t s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n ,  
among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a  s t a b l e  long-run environment f o r  f i rms  t o  develop .  This  
i n s u l a t i o n  from takeover  a t t empt s  w i l l  f r e e  managers from having t o  worry about 
meet ing  shor t - run  p r o f i t  g o a l s  and about having  acqu i r ed  r e s e r v e s  o r  cash which 
make i t  a  t a r g e t .  Shareholder  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Melvyn Weiss ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
a rgues  t h a t  management should n o t  be  e n t i t l e d  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i th  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between a  t h i r d  p a r t y  who wants  t o  make an o f f e r  and t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  whom 
t h e  o f f e r  i s  d i r e c t e d ,  o r  t o  prevent  a  sha reho lde r  from e a r n i n g  a  premium r e t u r n  
on h i s  i n v e s t m e n t ;  i n  h i s  v iew,  management i s  i n v a r i a b l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  keeping 
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  company and r e t a i n i n g  employment and t h e  p e r q u i s i t e s  o f  t h e  cor-  
p o r a t e  o f f i c e .  Weiss a l s o  a rgues  t h a t  management's r o l e  should be l i m i t e d  t o  
supp ly ing  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  a s s i s t  them i n  making an informed 
d e c i s i o n  a s  t o  whether  o r  no t  t o  accept  t h e  t h i r d  p a r t y ' s  o f f e r .  Fur thermore ,  
Weiss a rgues  t h a t ,  i f  management's use  o f  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  does  n o t  a l l ow  
t a k e o v e r s  t o  occur  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  normal f u n c t i o n i n g  of t h e  marke t ,  t hen  i n -  
e f f i c i e n t  management may remain i n  p l a c e  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  and 
t h e  company i n  g e n e r a l  might be b e t t e r  o f f  w i th  new management. 
But L i p t o n  contends  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  b e t t e r  o f f  i f  t h e y  do 
not  t e n d e r  t o  an o f f e r o r  and t h e  takeover  does  n o t  go th rough,  s i n c e  c a s e s  he  
ha s  s t u d i e d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  i n  s t o c k  p r i c e  a f t e r  a  t akeover  i s  
blocked i s  a t  l e a s t  a s  g r e a t  a s  t h e  premium o f f e r i n g  p r i c e .  Weiss d i s p u t e s  
t h i s  s i n c e  t h e  premium i s  f r e q u e n t l y  s u b s t a n t i a l  and t h e r e  a r e  f i n a n c i a l  bene- 
f i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  having t h e  use of  t h e  premium p r i c e  funds.  
L ip ton  a rgues  t h a t  cons ide r ing  o n l y  t h e  premium p r i c e  b e n e f i t  t o  share-  
h o l d e r s  i g n o r e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  w i th  l e g i t i m a t e  long-term i n t e r e s t s  
i n  t h e  company may g i v e  way t o  a r b i t r a g e u r s  i n t e r e s t e d  o n l y  i n  making a  k i l l i n g  
and not i n  t h e  long-run good of t h e  company. Weiss c o u n t e r s  t h a t  management 
i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  f r i e n d l y  "b ig  bro ther ' '  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  t h a t  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  
market  i s  s t i l l  a  f r e e  marke t ,  and t h a t  p a r t  o f  owning s h a r e s  i n  p u b l i c  compa- 
n i e s  c a r r i e s  w i th  i t  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s e l l  t o  t h o s e  who wish t o  buy. Weiss a l s o  
p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  a  dichotomy f r e q u e n t l y  e x i s t s  between management's o p i n i o n  o f  
t h e  v a l u e  of  a  company when faced wi th  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  and when t r y i n g  t o  t a k e  a  
company p r i v a t e .  Thus, management may a t tempt  t o  b lock  a  t e n d e r  o f f e r  from a  
third party as being inadequate when their jobs and positions of power are at 
stake, but the same management may attempt to take a company private by 
"freezing" or "squeezing" out the minority shareholders at prices well below 
what the third party might have used as the basis for the tender offer. 
Lipton endorses the current practice whereby courts rely on investment 
advisors and the findings of a board independent of management to approve the 
business judgment of management to reject a tender offer. But Weiss says this 
independence is not possible since it is the incumbent board which chooses the 
parties to evaluate the offer. Yet Lipton believes that there are so many 
reasons beyond premium price why a board may properly reject an offer that man- 
agement should be given wide discretion. 
Furthermore, it is Lipton's position that management can and should employ 
a wide variety of permissible techniques at its disposal to fend off an of- 
feror's attack. Weiss argues that some of these techniques result in an unwar- 
ranted shift of power from shareholders to management. For example, Weiss 
points out that, during the LTV bid for Grumman, Grumman's management replaced 
the pension fund managers and ordered the new managers to buy substantial 
amounts of Grumman stock to thwart the LTV tender offer. 851 Yet, by buying -
this stock, which had risen in price from the pre-tender offer price, manage- 
ment was willing to pay more for the stock than it would be worth if its ef- 
forts were successful and the takeover were blocked-in which case the price 
could fall to the prior levels. Thus management was seen to be using its of- 
fice to the possible detriment of the shareholders and the former employees who 
are pension fund holders. 
851 See also Carley, William M. Grumman Pension Plan Buys More Stock in 
~fforFto Block LTV, Which Plans Suit. Wall Street Journal, October 13, 
1981; and Carley, William M. Grulmnan, by Acquiring Its Own Shares, Seems 
to Be Gaining in Bid to Block LTV. Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1981. 
Also ,  depending on how t h e  d e a l  i s  s t r u c t u r e d ,  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  g roup of 
s h a r e h o l d e r s  may be poor ly  t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  "mop-up" p a r t  o f  t h e  d e a l  by t h e  man- 
egement o f  a  company g a i n i n g  c o n t r o l .  For example, i n  t h e  U.S. S t e e l  t ende r  
o f f e r  f o r  Marathon, t h e  o f f e r  was f o r  51 pe rcen t  of  Marathon's  s h a r e s  a t  125 
d o l l a r s  per  s h a r e .  But t h e  remaining 49 p e r c e n t ,  comprised o f  t h o s e  who e i t h e r  
d i d  not  t e n d e r  o r  t hose  who tendered but  were g iven  a pro  r a t a  v a l u e ,  a r e  of -  
f e r e d  U.S. S t e e l  deben tu re s  va lued  a t  l e s s  t h a n  80 d o l l a r s  per  s h a r e .  The in- 
t e r e s t s  of  t h i s  c l a s s  of  m i n o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s  (which could on occas ion  i n c l u d e  
employees r e f u s i n g  t o  t e n d e r )  who a r e  " f rozen  out"  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  some po l i cy  
concern  i n  t h e  takeover  p roces s .  
The r o l e  and i n t e r e s t s  of  v a r i o u s  branches  of  t h e  Government should a l s o  
be noted i n  t h e  merger process .  For example, t h e  Fede ra l  government may have 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  l a t i t u d e  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  cou r se  o f  merger and a c q u i s i t i o n  a c t i v i t y  
even b e f o r e  t h e  i s s u e s  reach  t h e  c o u r t s .  Informal  d i s c u s s i o n s  between FTC and 
J u s t i c e  Department a t t o r n e y s  may r e s u l t  i n  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  a  merger o r  breaking  
o f f  a  d e a l  even b e f o r e  a  premerger n o t i f i c a t i o n  i s  f i l e d .  The t iming  i n  merger 
d e a l s  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  such t h a t  r e q u e s t s  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  i n fo rma t ion  by t h e  FTC 
and J u s t i c e  Department can e f f e c t i v e l y  k i l l  a  d e a l ,  a s  occurred  i n  t h e  Mobil- 
Conoco proposed merger .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  some commentators contend t h a t  ce r -  
t a i n  r e g u l a t o r y  agenc i e s  have f a c i l i t a t e d  h o s t i l e  t akeove r s  by not  en fo rc ing  
s t a t u t o r y  requi rements  f o r  p r i o r  approval  of changes i n  c o n t r o l  ( t h i s  was a l -  
leged when t h e  C i v i l  Aeronaut ics  Board approved v o t i n g  t r u s t s  i n  t h e  Continen- 
t a l  A i r  and Western Air  c a s e s ) .  - 86/ 
Act ions  a t  t h e  S t a t e  l e v e l  can a l s o  a f f e c t  t h e  merger p roces s .  An impor- 
t a n t  q u e s t i o n  of  whether Fede ra l  o r  S t a t e  law should govern t ende r  o f f e r s  
86/ W r i t t e n  communication from a t t o r n e y  Mart in L ip ton  t o  CRS, 
~ a n u a r y  1982. 
i s  c u r r e n t l y  under review by t h e  Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Weiss has argued 
t h a t  S t a t e  law--which i s  f requen t ly  more favorable  t o  the  defensive  t a c t i c s  of 
management a t tempt ing t o  thwart a  takeover-should not  be t h e  binding de te r -  
minant of tender  o f f e r  outcomes. The r a t i o n a l e  i s  t h a t  shareholders  a s  well  as  
genera l  co rpora te  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  o f t e n  dispersed throughout t h e  country ,  yet  a  
company may c h a r t e r  i t s e l f  i n  a  S t a t e  with laws giving management more d i s -  
c r e t i o n  a t  t h e  expense of  the  r i g h t s  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  c l a s s  of shareholders .  
And where are the  i n t e r e s t s  of the  public a t  l a r g e  i n  t h i s  debate?  To the  
extent  t h a t  s t r u g g l e s  between management, sha reho lde rs ,  and employees produce 
a  Darwinian dynamic which leads  t o  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  the  production of goods and 
s e r v i c e s ,  the  pub l i c  w i l l  be b e t t e r  o f f .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  takeover a c t i -  
v i t y  crowds out hea l thy  competi t ion i n  t h e  economy, t h e  publ ic  w i l l  s u f f e r .  
The s t r u g g l e  i s  g r e a t  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  not only  t o  concen t ra t ion  of power through- 
out the  economy but a l s o  to  concentra t ion of power wi thin  the f i rm,  s i n c e  man- 
agement, shareholders ,  and employees have varying i n t e r e s t s  a t  s t ake .  Devising 
public pol icy  s t r a t e g i e s  and t a c t i c s  t o  achieve e q u i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  among a l l  
t h e  p a r t i e s  i s  a s  complex and dynamic a s  the  takeover process i t s e l f .  
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